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ARTICLES
DERIVING ORIGINALITY IN DERIVATIVE
WORKS: CONSIDERING THE QUANTUM OF
ORIGINALITY NEEDED TO ATTAIN COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION IN A DERIVATIVE WORK
Steven S. Boyd*
"[T]here is no new thing under the sun."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Innovations in science and technology constantly expand
the concept of creative expression, yielding media never be-
fore contemplated.2 These novel and diverse forms of expres-
sion continue to challenge the boundaries of the existing ru-
bric of copyright laws by forcing jurists and scholars to
reconsider fundamental concepts of intellectual property pro-
tection, such as originality in copyright law, in the context of
cutting edge media.3 At times, the legal community must
* Attorney of Law, Locke Liddell & Sapp LLP, Houston, Texas. LL.M.,
University of Houston Law Center; J.D., South Texas College of Law; B.S., Uni-
versity of Texas, Austin.
1. Ecclesiastes 1:9.
2. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5664 [hereinafter H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476].
3. See J. Lahore, Reprography Reproduction, in INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY: THE CHALLENGE TO COPYRIGHT (J. Lahore ed., 1984) ("In no
branch of the law other than copyright has the incidence of new technologies
revealed so many gaps and deficiencies for which the remedy can only be regu-
lation and supervision [by the legislature].") (quoting Comment on the Review of
Audiovisual Copyright Law in Australia, 56 AUSTL. L.J. 621, 622 (1982)); David
Ladd, Securing the Future of Copyright: A Humanist Endeavor, 9 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 413, 414 (1985); Michael Wurzer, Note, Infringement of the Exclu-
sive Right to Prepare Derivative Works: Reducing Uncertainty, 73 MINN. L. REV.
1521, 1524 n.16 (1989) (offering that technological innovation is a problem that
will always affect copyright law) (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, 414
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modify existing boundaries to accommodate technology, dem-
onstrating that copyright law is not written in stone but, to
the contrary, is a morphing set of rules designed to adapt to
modern applications.
When viewing copyright law at its most fundamental
level, two concepts form the threshold for receiving copyright
protection. First, a work must be an "original work of author-
ship."4 Second, the work must be "fixed in any tangible me-
dium of expression, now known or later developed, from
which it can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated," with or without "the aid of a machine or device."5
From this basis, the two touchstones of copyright protection-
"originality" and "fixation"-continue to develop distinct
meanings peculiar to the law of copyright.' Focusing on the
prerequisite of originality, courts repeatedly hold that a work
is original if the author independently created the work and
the work "possesses at least some minimal degree of creativ-
U.S. 417, 430 (1983)).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 359 (1991); Entertainment Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Crea-
tive Group, Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1021
(1998).
5. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in origi-
nal works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, re-
produced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of
a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following catego-
ries:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of author-
ship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of opera-
tion, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it
is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
Id.
6. See NEIL BOORSTYN, BOORSTYN ON COPYRIGHT 2-2 (Supp. 1995 & 1996).
But see Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 908 (3rd Cir.
1975) ("It is true that originality is not a prerequisite of copyright, and even a
modicum of creativity may suffice for a work to be protected.") (emphasis
added).
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ity."7 Even at this most fundamental level of copyright law,
courts continually struggle to resolve the friction between
traditional concepts of copyright protection and the increas-
ingly innovative applications of those concepts.
This article encapsulates the subtleties that have devel-
oped throughout the courts' progress in defining the essential
concept in copyright law known as originality-specifically
the originality required in derivative works.' Initially, this
article introduces the basic concept of originality, describing
the constitutional and statutory framework that grants courts
the authority to mold its meaning and application.! After fil-
tering out the integrated ideas of novelty and creativity from
the distinct requirement of originality,1" the focus of this arti-
cle shifts to the quantum of originality necessary to attain
copyright protection." Although proof of a quantum of origi-
nality serves as a threshold requirement for any work seeking
copyright protection," this discussion ultimately focuses on
the vacillating quantum of originality necessary to secure
copyright protection in the emerging arena of derivative
works. 3 Finally, the discussion proffers a proposal for simpli-
7. See, e.g., Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 345; Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124
F.3d 1366, 1373 (10th Cir. 1997).
8. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 2, at 52 (stating that court deci-
sions should guide the Copyright Office on what constitutes an original work of
authorship); see also Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 357; Peter Jaszi, Toward a
Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991 DUKE L.J. 455,
459-60 n.ll (1991).
9. See infra Parts L.A and I.B.1-2 (discussing the fundamental and statu-
tory bases for copyright protection).
10. See infra Part I.B.3-4 (distinguishing originality from the concepts of
novelty and creativity).
11. See infra Part II (introducing the basis of copyright law and addressing
the rudimentary concerns in copyright law).
12. See Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 345.
13. See infra Parts III and IV (illustrating the development and nuances in
assessing the quantum of originality needed to attain protection in a derivative
work, regardless of the public domain status of the underlying work). As stated
in 17 U.S.C. § 101:
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more pre-existing
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fic-
tionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduc-
tion, abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of an edito-
rial revisions, annotations, elaboration, or other modifications, which,
as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative
work."
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
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fying the copyright application process, requiring the same
quantum of originality to attain copyright protection in a de-
rivative work, regardless of the status of the work.'4
A. The Sine Qua Non of Copyright
"A prime requisite for copyright protection under the
Constitution is originality."'5 As Justice O'Connor stated in
Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co., "[t]he sine
qua non of copyright is originality." 6 Even a cursory review
of concepts inherent to copyright protection establishes origi-
nality as the very essence of protection. Throughout copy-
right jurisprudence, the originality requirement remains the
single pervading prerequisite to copyright protection, regard-
less of the form of work.'
7
Originality is itself a fluid concept, not an objective crite-
rion. Therefore it is constantly being refined by the courts.
As a starting point for analyzing originality, it can be de-
scribed as a foundation for protection," requiring that a given
work be original to the author. 9 Because originality flows
from the efforts of a particular author, it necessarily follows
that an original work must not be more than a mere copy."
The work must embody some modest amount of individual in-
tellectual labor in order to qualify as a "work of authorship"
entitled to copyright protection.'
Although originality appears to be objective in nature,
14. See infra Part IV.
15. Hearings on S. 597 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and
Copyrights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. (1967) (statement of
Douglas A. Anello, National Association of Broadcasters).
16. Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 345; accord Warren Publ'g, Inc. v. Micro-
dos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1515 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 963
(1997).
17. See L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d Cir. 1976).
18. See Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 345 (citing Harper & Row, Publish-
ers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547-49 (1985)). But see Entertainment
Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1221 (9th
Cir. 1997) ("Originality in this context 'means little more than a prohibition of
actual copying."').
19. See Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 345; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547-
49; Urantia Found. v. Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955, 58 (9th Cir. 1997).
20. See Waldman Publ'g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 782 (2d Cir.
1994); L. Batlin & Son, 536 F.2d at 490.
21. See Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Bal-
timore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 668
n.6 (7th Cir. 1986) (distinguishing the concepts of originality, creativity, and
novelty).
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various interpretations of artistic originality have developed,
proving the difficulty in examining this multifaceted concept.
For example, as a threshold matter, artistic originality does
not equate to the legal concept of originality in the Copyright
Act.2 ' As Circuit Judge Frank stated in Alfred Bell & Co. v.
Catalda Fine Arts,23 "[n]o matter how poor artistically the
'author's' addition, it is enough if it be his own. 24
Courts struggle to adapt the concept of originality to in-
creasingly complex and novel scenarios. However, the intri-
cacies of originality require the exploration of the evolution
leading to the modern interpretation of originality. Such
analysis begins with the basis of the authority granting the
judiciary the power to take these evolutionary steps-the
Constitution of the United States-and its role in copyright
law.
B. The Constitutional Underpinnings of Originality
The authors of the Copyright Act of 1976 ("Copyright
Act") drafted it both to reward the creators of copyrighted
works and to promote "broad public availability of literature,
music, and the other arts."5 However, before reaping the
benefits of such protections, a copyright seeker must satisfy
certain requirements. One such requirement, originality, is
both a statutory and constitutional prerequisite for copyright
protection.26 Rather than reviewing a work in terms of the la-
bor or effort involved in its creation, statutory and common
law developments have focused on originality as the funda-
mental basis for receiving copyright protection. 7 This belief
that a person should be rewarded for his or her contribution
to society is supported by the Constitution, which provides for
22. See Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Artis-
tic originality indeed might inhere in a detail, a nuance, a shading too small to
be apprehended by a judge.").
23. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
24. Id. at 103 (citing Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S.
239, 239 (1903)).
25. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 711 (2d Cir.
1992); see Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 710 (1984); Laser-
comb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 n.20 (4th Cir. 1990); Hubbard
Broad., Inc. v. Southern Satellite Sys., Inc., 777 F.2d 393, 396 (8th Cir. 1985).
26. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346
(1991); Mid Am. Title Co. v. Kirk, 59 F.3d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 1995).
27. See Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 364; Superior Form Builders, Inc. v.
Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., Inc., 74 F.3d 488, 492 (4th Cir. 1996).
2000] 329
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Congress's authority to encourage creative activity by re-
warding the author with the potential for monetary gain.
"The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts."'28
The Constitution empowers Congress "[tlo promote the
Progress of Science . . . by securing for limited times to
Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings.. ,,29 The statement of a copyright's purpose in the
Constitution indicates its two correlative functions. First,
copyright law encourages authors to create and publish their
works by granting them a monopoly over the economic exploi-
tation of their works. ° Second, it ensures a constant source of
new works for the public. This promotes thought and assures
that the works eventually will be free for others to use to cre-
ate further new works." Considering these correlative func-
tions, the Supreme Court defined "authors" and "writings" in
two decisions from the late nineteenth century.32 The Court
continues to hold that these cases presuppose a degree of
originality.33
1. Originality in "Writings" from the Trade-Mark Cases
In the Trade-Mark Cases,34 the Supreme Court addressed
the constitutional scope of "writings" in the context of origi-
nality.0 Justice Miller, writing for the Court, considered
what was necessary for classification "under the head of
writings of authors." 6 He explained:
28. See e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
29. Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 346. In full, Clause 8 authorizes Con-
gress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
30. See Christine Wallace, Note, Overlapping Interests in Derivative Works
and Compilations, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 103, 105 (1985).
31. See id. at 105-06.
32. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884); The
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
33. See Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 346.
34. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 82.
35. See id. at 94; Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 346.
36. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 93-94 (considering the "insur-
mountable difficulties" with identifying the essential characteristics of a trade-
mark with inventions and discoveries in the arts and sciences, or with the
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In this, as in regard to inventions, originality is required.
And while the word writings may be liberally construed,
as it has been, to include original designs for engraving,
prints, etc., it is only such as are original, and are founded
in the creative powers of the mind. The writings which are
to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embod-
ied in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the like. 7
Thus, some indicia of originality must be present in a "writ-
ing" before it may be afforded copyright protection.
2. Originality in "Authors" in Burrow-Giles
In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,38 five years
after the Trade-Mark Cases, the Court considered the issue of
originality as it relates to "authors." Consistent with the
Court's finding of an originality requirement in the meaning
of "writings" in the Trade-Mark Cases, the Court ultimately
distilled the same originality requirement from the Constitu-
tion's use of the word "authors."39 In Burrow-Giles," Justice
Miller defined "author," in a constitutional sense, to mean "he
to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker."'" As in
the Trade-Mark Cases, the Court emphasized the creative
component of originality. 2 Justice Miller described copyright
as being limited to "original intellectual conceptions of the
author"43 and stressed the importance of requiring an author
who accuses another of infringement to prove "the existence
of those facts of originality, of intellectual production, of
thought, and conception."44 Justice Miller found originality in
"the subject so as to present graceful outlines, arranging and
disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the de-
sired expression, and from such disposition, arrangement, or
representation, made entirely by plaintiff.' 5
writings of authors).
37. Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
38. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
39. See Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 346.
40. Burrow-Giles Lithographic, 111 U.S. at 53.
41. Id. at 58.
42. See Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 346.
43. Burrow-Giles Lithographic, 111 U.S. at 58.
44. Id. at 59-60.
45. Id. at 60.
These findings, we think, show this photograph to be an original work
of art, the product of plaintiffs intellectual invention, of which plaintiff
is the author, and of a class of inventions for which the constitution in-
tended that congress should secure to him the exclusive right to use,
20001
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"The originality requirement articulated in [the] Trade-
Mark Cases and Burrow-Giles remains the touchstone of
copyright protection today."46 While courts continue to shape
the concept of originality, it is clear that originality is distinct
from the concepts of novelty and creativity.
3. Unnecessary Novelty
Though not explored in early copyright cases, neither
congressional intent 47 nor judicial construction 41 of copyright
protection includes a novelty requirement. Instead, courts
require the presence of independent creation.4 ' As a result of
this legal construction, a work can enjoy copyright protection
even though it is substantially similar to an existing work. °
In short, the standard for copyright protection does not re-
quire "novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit,"' but rather only
mandates that the work 'display something irreducible,
which is one man's alone,' not that the work be novel in com-
parison with the works of others."5
Analogously, Justice Clark, while considering a patent
case, stated that "[ilnnovation, advancement, and things
which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requi-
sites in a patent system which by constitutional command
must 'promote the Progress of ... useful Arts.' This is the
standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ig-
nored." 3 Unlike patent law, which rewards the first in time,
publish, and sell, as it has done by section 4952 of the Revised Statutes.
Id.
46. Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 347 (citing Goldstein v. California, 412
U.S. 546, 561-62 (1973)).
47. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 2, at 51 ("This standard does not
include requirements of novelty... and there is not intention to enlarge the
standard of copyright protection to require them.").
48. See Doran v. Sunset House Distrib. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940, 944 (S.D.
Cal. 1961), affd, 304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962); see also Financial Info., Inc. v.
Moody's Investor's Serv., Inc., 751 F.2d 501, 507 (2d Cir. 1984); Stein v. Mazer,
204 F.2d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1953), affd, 347 U.S. 201.
49. See L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976); Al-
fred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951); E.
Mishan & Sons, Inc. v. Marycana, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1339, 1342-43 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
50. See Alfred Bell & Co., 191 F.2d at 103.
51. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 2, at 51.
52. United States v. Hamilton, 583 F.2d 448, 451 (9th Cir. 1978) (quoting
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903)).
53. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966); Newell Cos.,
Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 777 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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copyright law protects originality. Copyright law then confers
on the owner the sole right to both reproduce the work and
control all channels through which the work may reach the
market.54
Circuit Judge Frank differentiated the constitutional re-
quirements for patent and copyright protection in Alfred Bell
& Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts.55 Judge Frank stated that "the
very language of the Constitution differentiates (a) 'authors'
and their 'writings' from (b) 'inventors' and their 'discoveries.'
Those who penned the Constitution, of course, knew the dif-
ference."" He explained that the term "inventor" carried "an
implication which excludes the result of only ordinary skill," 7
and that "nothing in the Constitution commands that copy-
righted matter be strikingly unique or novel."58
In short, to satisfy the originality standard in copyright
law, an author must produce an independent creation, not
copied from other works."' Contrary to patent law's novelty
requirement, an author's original work may receive copyright
protection even if a completely identical work exists, provided
the author did not copy his work from the prior identical
work." As Judge Learned Hand stated, "[i]f by some magic a
man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's
Ode On a Grecian Urn, he would be an 'author,' and, if he
copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they
might of course copy Keats's."6
54. Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch., Inc., 575 F.2d 62, 64
(3d Cir. 1978).
55. Alfred Bell & Co., 191 F.2d at 100.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 102 (quoting Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250).
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
345 (1991).
60. See, e.g., Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d
1090, 1092 (2d Cir. 1977).
61. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corps., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.
1936). As one commentator has offered on Judge Hand's holding,
The key, then, to understanding this definition of "originality" is Judge
Hand's premise that the second author "had never known" Keats's
poem. In Hand's view, because the second poet had no access to Keats's
poem, the second poem was, by definition, "original." This under-
standing of originality makes it clear that the second poem's literal
identity, or exact similarity, does not make it unoriginal. "Originality,"
then, under this view, means simply "uncopied."
Russ VerSteeg, Sparks in the Tinderbox: Feist, "Creativity," and the Legislative
History of the 1976 Copyright Act, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 549, 580-81 (1995) (em-
20001 333
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Whether the seekers of copyright protection must demon-
strate creativity, however, is another matter entirely.
4. Contrasting Creativity with Originality
Courts have consistently viewed creativity as distinct
from originality." "To constitute a 'work of authorship,' the
material deposited with the Register must pass a 'creativity'
threshold, i.e., it must embody 'some modest amount of intel-
lectual labor.'
63
It is important to distinguish among three separate con-
cepts-originality, creativity, and novelty. A work is origi-
nal if it is the independent creation of its author. A work
is creative if it embodies some modest amount of intellec-
tual labor. A work is novel if it differs from existing works
in some relevant respect. For a work to be copyrightable,
it must be original and creative, but need not be novel.64
Circuit Judge Eschbach in Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major
League Baseball Players Ass'n,65 clarified:
Although the requirements of independent creation and
intellectual labor both flow from the constitutional pre-
requisite of authorship and the statutory reference to
original works of authorship, courts often engender confu-
sion by referring to both concepts by the term "originality."
For the sake of clarity, we shall use "originality" to mean
independent authorship and "creativity" to denote intellec-
tual labor.66
phasis added) [hereinafter VerSteeg, Sparks in the Tinderbox].
62. See Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 345. But see, e.g., Transwestern
Publ'g Co. v. Multimedia Mktg. Assocs., Inc, 133 F.3d 773, 776 (10th Cir. 1998)
(using originality and creativity in the same context) (citing Key Publications,
Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ'g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 513, 516 (2d Cir.
1991)); but see also L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The
Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 719, 761 n.150 (1989) (treating "original" and "creativity" as
synonymous terms).
63. Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citing
Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663,
668 n.6 (7th Cir. 1986) (distinguishing the concepts 'originality,' 'creativity,' and
'novelty,' and observing that "[flor a work to be copyrightable, it must be origi-
nal and creative, but need not be novel")).
64. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 668 n.6 (emphasis added) (referring to
MELVILLE NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS §§ 1.06[A], 1.08[C][1], 2.01[A]-
[B] (1985)).
65. Id. at 663.
66. Id. at 668 n.6 (emphasis added).
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a. A Minimal Element of Creativity
Courts seek a "minimal element of creativity over and
above the requirement of independent effort" in the concept of
originality." "In order to be acceptable as a pictorial, graphic,
or sculptural work, the work must embody some creative
authorship in its delineation or form."68 In Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc.,6" Justice O'Connor
clarified that "[t]he requisite level of creativity is extremely
low; even a slight amount will suffice."7 Therefore, courts re-
quire only a modicum of creativity to be present in a work for
it to be copyrightable.7' Judges in subsequent court decisions
are quick to state that "[iut is a mistake ... to conclude that
the Supreme Court in Feist sought to elevate the originality
standard."72
"[O]nly an unmistakable dash of originality need be dem-
onstrated in law of copyright; high standards of uniqueness in
creativity are dispensed with."73 The vast majority of works
make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative
67. See L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976)
(citing NIMMER, supra note 64, § 10.2, at 36).
68. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 800 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing 37
C.F.R. § 202.10).
(a) In order to be acceptable as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work,
the work must embody some creative authorship in its delineation or
form. The registrability of such a work is not affected by the intention
of the author as to the use of the work or the number of copies repro-
duced. The availability of protection or grant of protection under the
law for a utility or design patent will not affect the registrability of a
claim in an original work of pictorial, graphic, or sculptural authorship.
37 C.F.R. § 202.10 (1998) (emphasis added).
69. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
70. Id. at 345. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1972) (inter-
preting writings to include "any physical rendering of the fruits of creative in-
tellectual or aesthetic labor"); L. Batlin & Son, 536 F.2d at 490 (stating that the
concept of originality implies a creativity requirement quite separate from a re-
quirement of independent effort); Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Con-
trols Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (holding that computer-scored
answer sheets involved sufficient creativity).
71. See, e.g., Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 669 n.7 (citing L. Batlin & Son,
536 F.2d at 486; Gilles-Widmer Co. v. Milton Bradley Co., 313 F.2d 143, 146
(7th Cir. 1963); Wihtol v. Wells, 231 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1956); Alfred Bell &
Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951); NIMMER, supra note
64, §§ 1.08[C] [1], 2.01[B], 2.08[B] [1]).
72. Oasis Publ'g Co., Inc. v. West Publ'g Co., 924 F. Supp. 918, 923 (D.
Minn. 1996).
73. Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1321 (2d Cir. 1989). See Ver-
Steeg, Sparks in the Tinderbox, supra note 61, at 558 n.49 (outlining the even-
tual deletion of "creative" from the language of § 102).
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spark, "no matter how crude, humble or obvious.7 4 Just as
originality does not connote novelty, 5 creativity only applies
to works bearing a spark of distinctiveness in copyrightable
expression."6 Therefore, a proponent must merely demon-
strate a distinctive "unmistakable dash of originality.""
b. The Essence of Originality
Creativity exists as a critical component of originality be-
cause a copyrightable work must be not only "created," in the
sense of being brought into existence, but it must also be
minimally "creative.""5 "Creative" is defined as "[i]nventive;
imaginative .. .exhibiting imagination as well as intellect
and thus [is] differentiated from the merely critical, 'aca-
demic,' journalistic, professional, mechanical, etc. in litera-
ture or artistic production."' 9 In fact, there may be a "recipro-
cal relationship" between originality and creativity so that
the smaller the effort, the greater the creativity necessary for
protection."
Imagination serves as the touchstone of creativity.8' As
District Judge Zagel explained in American Dental Ass'n v.
74. Urantia Found. v. Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955, 959 (9th Cir. 1997); see
CMM Cable Rep. Inc. v. Ocean Coast Properties, Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1516 (1st
Cir. 1996); CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d
61, 65 (2d Cir. 1994).
75. See supra Part I.B.3 (dispelling the need for a work seeking copyright
protection to demonstrate novelty).
76. See Warren Publ'g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1524
(11th Cir. 1997).
77. Weissmann, 868 F.2d at 1321. But see Russ VerSteeg, Rethinking
Originality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 826 (1993) [hereinafter VerSteeg, Re-
thinking Originality] ("Feist's creativity requirement appears to have collided
with Congress' express intent assiduously to avoid using creativity as an ele-
ment of copyrightability.").
78. American Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1714,
1720 (N.D. Ill. 1996), judgment vacated, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997). See also
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarcony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884); The Trade-
Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96 (1879). But see VerSteeg, Sparks in the Tinderbox,
supra note 61, at 556 n.35 (citing the Official Transcript at 14, Feist Publica-
tions, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (No. 89-1909)).
79. American Dental Ass'n, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1720 (citing 3 OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1135 (2d ed. 1989)).
80. See Brian Dahl, Comment, Originality and Creativity in Reporter Pagi-
nation: A Contradiction in Terms?, 74 IOWA L. REV. 713, 718 (1989) (citing Uni-
versal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 908 (3rd Cir. 1975) (citing
NIMMER, supra note 64, § 2.01[B], at 2-15)).
81. See American Dental Ass'n, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1720.
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Delta Dental Plans Ass'n,82
notions of de minimis creativity do not quite jibe with the
concept of "imagination" if it is defined as "the creative
faculty of the mind in its highest aspect; the power of
framing new and striking intellectual conceptions; poetic
genius." If copyrightability were dependent on qualities of
poetic genius, the body of material suitable for copyright
would be slim indeed. 3
Because determinations of degrees of imagination are inher-
ently subjective, and therefore ill-suited for judicial resolu-
tion, "a less artistically demanding-and less subjective-
definition is necessary. So it may be conceptually more
helpful to simply define 'imagination' as '[t]he power which
the mind has of forming concepts beyond those derived from
external objects.' 84
Jurisprudence and judicial interpretation of statutory
law establish a set of building blocks upon which copyright
law is structured. Each component not only serves as the
foundation for another concept, but also depends on an un-
derlying concept for support. In cursory review of the infra-
structure, "copyrightability depends on originality, originality
on creativity, and creativity on imagination."" With the un-
derstanding that originality is a distinct concept from either
novelty or creativity, the question becomes qualitative in na-
ture. By analyzing discussions of the originality prerequisite
for copyright protection in the large body of statutory and
common law, it is possible to decipher whether there is, in
fact, a formulaic pattern to determining the quantum of
originality needed to attain status as an "original work of
authorship"8 entitled to copyright protection.
II. "ORIGINAL WORKS OF AUTHORSHIP"
The legislature purposely left the phrase "original works
of authorship"" undefined in the Copyright Act of 1976.88
82. Id. at 1721.
83. Id. (citation omitted).
84. Id.
85. Id. (discussing the syllogism and inherent difficulties with administer-
ing a subjective test).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
87. Id.
88. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 2, at 51. See also Patterson &
Joyce, supra note 62, at 759 n.139 ("Apparently, Congress felt that prior case
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Congress intended to incorporate without change the stan-
dard of originality established by the courts under the Copy-
right Act of 1909.9 Therefore, understanding the meaning of
originality requires a review of the case law under the 1909
Act.90
The 1909 Act neither defined originality nor even ex-
pressly required that a work be original to receive protec-
tion.91 However, the courts uniformly applied the originality
element, affording copyright protection only to "authors" or
their successors in interest." In fact, Congress did not ex-
plicitly recognize the originality requirement in a copyright
statute until 1976,9' because the legislature "intended to in-
corporate without change the standard of originality estab-
lished by the courts."94 Following the legislature's lead, a dis-
cussion of the court decisions reviewing the concept of
originality in copyright law serves as a necessary and logical
starting point.
The following discussion begins with a distinction be-
tween "first generation" works (works wholly created by the
author) and "second generation" works (works that rely on
law would provide the courts adequate guidelines for construing this require-
ment.").
89. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, supra note 2, at 51; see also CRAIG JOYCE ET
AL., COPYRIGHT LAw 60 (3rd ed. 1994) ("You will search § 101 of the 1976 Act in
vain for any definition of this key term.").
90. See NIMMER, supra note 64, § 2.01.
91. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 351
(1991) (citing NIMMER, supra note 64, § 2.01).
92. But see Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 908 (3rd
Cir. 1975) ("It is true that originality is not a prerequisite of copyright. ... ").
93. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) ("Copyright protection subsists ... in
original works of authorship .... ) (emphasis added). See also H.R. REP. No.
94-1476, supra note 2, at 51 ("This standard does not include requirements of
novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit, and there is no intention to enlarge the
standard of copyright to require them.").
94. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); see also VerSteeg, Sparks in the Tinderbox, supra
note 61, at 550-51 n.5 (criticizing the drafting process of the 1976 Copyright
Act) (quoting Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History,
72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 860-61 (1987)).
Most of the statutory language was not drafted by members of Con-
gress or their staffs at all. Instead, the language evolved through a
process of negotiation among authors, publishers, and other parties
with economic interests in the property rights the statute defines. In
some cases, affected parties agreed upon language, which was then
adopted by Congress, while disagreeing about what the language
meant.
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previous works)." Next, it resolves that as the level of inde-
pendent creation increases, so does the level of protection af-
forded by copyright law. Under the Copyright Act, a wholly
creative, "first generation" work is entitled to the most protec-
tion.9' Consequently, "second generation" works, derivative
works and compilations, receive less protection." Finally,
works devoid of creativity receive no copyright protection at
all.98
In short, copyright law more vigorously protects highly
original and highly expressive works than functional and
nonfiction works." This article ultimately attempts to un-
ravel some of the conflicts developing in achieving the quan-
tum of originality necessary to acquire copyright protection,
focusing primarily on emerging issues in one of the two types
of "second generation" works: the derivative work.
A. "First Generation" Works-Wholly Original Works
"A work that is neither a compilation nor a derivative
work falls into the abyss of the undefined; the Copyright Act
does not label or define noncompilations or nonderivatives." °°
Classifying all works as either compilations or derivatives,
95. See Patterson & Joyce, supra note 62, at 758 n.135.
It may be useful to think of § 102(a) works as "first generation" works,
to distinguish them from § 103(a) derivative works and compilations,
which are "second generation" works in the sense that they are com-
posed, at least in significant part, of materials drawn from preexisting
works (in the case of derivative works) or the public domain (in the case
of compilations).
Id. See also VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, supra note 77, at 811 n.23 (de-
fining "first generation" works as "freestanding" works).
96. See, e.g., Warren Publ'g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Crop., 115 F.3d 1509,
1515 (11th Cir. 1997).
97. See id.; see also VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, supra note 77, at 805
n.ll ("Professor Ginsburg has advocated a recognition of 'low authorship' and
'high authorship' works. The distinction between Professor Ginsburg's types
turns in part on the status of the work in question, that is, whether it is a com-
pilation, derivative, or freestanding work.") (citing Jane Ginsburg, Creation and
Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1866-72 (1990)).
98. See Warren Publ'g, 115 F.3d at 1515.
99. See Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d
1335, 1347 (5th Cir. 1994), opinion supplemented, 46 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1995).
100. VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, supra note 77, at 816. "Arguably,
there can be no freestanding works under the Act. Such an argument rests
upon the assumption that every work is, to some degree, either a compilation of
preexisting elements and/or works, or else a derivation of a preexisting work or
works." Id.
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however, is not sound copyright policy. Although all
works are to some extent compilative or derivative, ["first
generation"] works do exist. As a general rule, a ["first
generation"] work is a work that is not substantially simi-
lar to any preexisting works or materials; if it were sub-
stantially similar, then it would be either a compilation or
a derivative work. An exception to this general rule would
arise when a work does bear a substantial similarity to a
preexisting work or material, but the substantial similar-
ity is coincidence and not a result of copying."'
Thus, first generation works require some creative intellec-
tual or aesthetic labor. However, "a very slight degree of such
labor [and] almost any ingenuity in selection, combination, or
expression, no matter how crude, humble, or obvious, will
[suffice] .,,02 Comparing unoriginal to original first generation
works demonstrates the need for originality in copyright pro-
tection.
1. Works Not Up to the Challenge-Unoriginal Works
"[E]ven a 'first generation' work must surmount the bar-
rier of nontrivial originality before it is entitled to copy-
right."'' 3 Some works simply cannot demonstrate this mini-
mal level of creativity. For example, "[p]hrases and
expressions conveying an idea typically expressed in a limited
number of stereotyped fashions are not subject to copyright
protection [because each] contain[s] little in the way of origi-
nal expression."'' 4  "The Copyright Office routinely denies
registration, for example, for names, titles, catchwords, catch
phrases, mottoes, slogans, and short advertising expres-
sions."' 0 For instance, in Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble
Co.,' the rules for a sweepstakes involving the use of the
participants' social security numbers were so straightforward
and simple that originality could not attach.'7
Courts have likewise deemed numbers, on the whole, as
being unworthy of copyright protection. In Toro Co. v. R & R
101. Id. at 817 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) ("freestanding" replaced
with "first generation" for uniformity throughout this article).
102. West Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1223 (8th Cir.
1986).
103. Patterson & Joyce, supra note 62, at 760 n.144.
104. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 1989).
105. Patterson & Joyce, supra note 62, at 760 n.144.
106. Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
107. See id. at 679.
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Products Co.,1"8 the Eighth Circuit denied copyright protection
for professional lawn care machine replacement part num-
bers °9 and held that "the system lacks the requisite original-
ity for copyright protection.""' Circuit Judge Timbers stated:
[Toro's] parts numbering "system" falls short of even the
low threshold of originality. The random and arbitrary
use of numbers in the public domain does not evince
enough originality to distinguish authorship. The expres-
sion itself is nothing more than the public domain num-
bers. There is no variation, other than the trivial hyphen,
to establish authorship .... Originality is a very low
threshold, but still a threshold."'
Analogously, facts are not copyrightable."2  Perhaps
"[t]he most fundamental axiom of copyright law [states] that
'[nio author may copyright his ideas or the facts he nar-
rates."' 3
"No one may claim originality as to facts." . . . This is be-
cause facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship.
The distinction is one between creation and discovery: The
first person to find and report a particular fact has not
created the fact; he or she has merely discovered its exis-
tence."4
"The same is true of all facts-scientific, historical, biographi-
cal, and news of the day.""' "[Tihey may not be copyrighted
and are part of the public domain available to every per-
son.""' Unlike facts, numbers, and catch phrases, some first
generation works manage to evidence enough originality to
warrant copyright protection.
2. Original Works-Above and Beyond
First generation works merit copyright protection when
108. Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1986).
109. See id. at 1216.
110. Id. at 1213.
111. Id. (emphasis added).
112. See Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991).
113. Id. at 344-45 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.
471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)).
114. Id. at 347 (emphasis added) (quoting NIMMER, supra note 64, § 2.11[A],
at 2-157).
115. Id. at 348.
116. Id. (citing Miller v. Universal Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369 (5th
Cir. 1981)).
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the work results from an independent creation."7 Even if the
work is completely identical to prior work, it is original for
purposes of copyright protection if it is not copied from the
prior work."8 Thus, fulfillment of the ultimate test of origi-
nality requires proof that the work originated with the
author,"9 without conscious or even unconscious reference to
prior works. 2 '
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc., v. McCall Pattern
Co.,"2 though dealing with an infringement, illustrates that
an original work is entitled to copyright protection despite
similarities with already existing products. Original Appala-
chian Artworks, Inc., owners of the interests to "The Cabbage
Patch Kids, '22 sued McCall Pattern Company for selling pat-
terns used to create soft-sculpture dolls called "Blossom Ba-
bies."'2 3 District Judge Tidwell held that "McCall's evidence
establishes that its dolls were independently created by Faye
Wine." '24 Therefore, though there may be a similarity to ex-
isting works, independently created works enjoy copyright
protection.
The minimum creativity requirement applied to "first
generation" works appears to generate bright-line rules, even
if those rules depend ultimately on the author's prior expo-
sure to previously existing materials. However, courts sub-
117. See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.
1976) ("There must be independent creation, but it need not be invention in the
sense of striking uniqueness, ingeniousness, or novelty .... ").
118. See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103
(2d Cir. 1951).
119. See, e.g., Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 345 (emphasis added).
120. See generally Abkco Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988,
997-99 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding copyright infringement based on a theory of sub-
conscious copying because "He's So Fine" had been the most popular song in the
United States for five weeks and among the thirty top hits in England for seven
weeks during the year in which George Harrison composed "My Sweet Lord,"
the infringing song). But see Jewel Music Publ'g Co. v. Leo Feist, Inc., 62 F.
Supp. 596, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (holding that even though almost 10,000 copies
of the complaining song had been distributed or sold and the music had also
been broadcast on national performances, the showing of access was insufficient
to support infringement)
121. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc., v. McCall Pattern Co., 649 F.
Supp. 832 (N.D. Ga. 1986), affd, 825 F.2d 355 (11th Cir. 1987).
122. See id. at 833 (explaining that "Cabbage Patch Kids" are soft-sculpture
dolls sold with birth and adoption certificates).
123. See id. (explaining that Faye Wine, a doll collector and designer, granted
to McCall the right to manufacture and sell patterns of soft-sculpture dolls de-
signed by her).
124. Id. at 836.
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ject "second generation" works to a more rigorous creativity
standard, implying that a different quantum of originality
may be required depending on the type of work involved.
B. "Second Generation" Works-The Dwarf on the Giant's
Shoulders25
While § 103(a) of the Copyright Act provides that compi-
lations and derivative works fall within the purview of copy-
right law, such protection will not shield a work making un-
lawful use of preexisting, copyrighted material. 26 "[T]he
criteria of copyrightable subject matter stated in section 102
apply with full force to works that are entirely original and to
those containing preexisting material."127 Succinctly stated,
while courts and the legislature interpret copyright law as
protecting compilations and derivative works, the basic tenet
remains the same. Originality serves as the cornerstone of
proving a work copyrightable, and as such, copyright law pro-
tects only those aspects of an author's compilation or deriva-
tive work that are original to the author. 8
"The most important point here is one that is commonly
misunderstood today: copyright in a 'new version' covers only
the material added by the later author, and has no effect one
125. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 n.28
(1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The world goes ahead because each of us
builds on the work of our predecessors. 'A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a
giant can see farther than the giant himself."') (quoting Zechariah Chafee Jr.,
Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 511 (1945)).
126. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994). "The subject matter of copyright as speci-
fied by section 102 includes compilations and derivative works, but protection
for a work employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists does not
extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used lawfully."
Id. "Section 103 complements section 102." H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, supra note
2, at 57-58; see also Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir.
1998) ([A] work will be considered a derivative work only if it would be consid-
ered an infringing work if the material which it has derived from a preexisting
work had been taken without the consent of a copyright proprietor of such pre-
existing work.") (citations omitted).
127. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 2, at 57.
128. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b).
The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the
material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from
the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any
exclusive right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such work
is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration,
ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexist-
ing material.
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way or the other on the copyright or public domain status of
the preexisting material."29 The terms "compilations" and
"derivative works" were intended to cover every copyrightable
work that employs preexisting material or data.
3 0
The following section does not attempt to explore all of
the diverse facets of "second generation works." Instead, the
section briefly introduces the evolving law of compilations,
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.,' and Feist's impact on the law con-
cerning originality.
1. Compilations
Section 101 of the 1976 Act defines a "compilation" as "a
work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or ar-
ranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole con-
stitutes an original work of authorship."'32  The statutory
definition expressly emphasizes that collections of facts are
not copyrightable per se. 3 ' The statute identifies three dis-
tinct elements of a compilation and requires applicants to ful-
fill each before the work qualifies as a copyrightable compila-
tion: (1) the collection and assembly of pre-existing material,
facts, or data; (2) the selection, coordination, or arrangement
of those materials; and (3) the creation, by virtue of the par-
ticular selection, coordination, or arrangement, of an "origi-
nal" work of authorship.
34
The first requirement merely describes the normal con-
cept of a compilation-a collection of pre-existing material,
129. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 2, at 57.
130. See id. (stating that "[t]here is necessarily some overlapping between
the two, but they basically represent different concepts").
131. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
132. 17 U.S.C. § 101. "A 'compilation' results from a process of selecting,
bringing together, organizing, and arranging previously existing material of all
kinds, regardless of whether the individual items in the material have been or
ever could have been subject to copyright." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note
2, at 57; Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 674, 679 (2d Cir.
1998).
133. See Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 357.
134. See id. ("This tripartite conjunctive structure is self-evident, and should
be assumed to 'accurately express the legislative purpose."') (quoting Mills Mu-
sic, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 164 (1985)). See also Patterson & Joyce, supra
note 62, at 757-58 n.136 (citing W. PATRY, LATMAN'S COPYRIGHT LAW 63-64
(6th ed. 1986)).
344 [Vol. 40
DERIVING ORIGINALITY
facts, or data."5 The third requirement emphasizes that a
compilation, like any other work, may prove copyrightable
only if it satisfies the originality requirement."6 The key to
the definition of compilation is the second requirement, which
instructs the courts determining whether a fact-based work is
an original work of authorship to focus on the manner in
which the collected facts have been selected, coordinated, and
arranged.'37 As such, "[n]ot every selection, coordination, or
arrangement will pass muster."'38 As Justice O'Connor stated
in Feist,13 "though a work qualifies as a copyrightable compi-
lation, that copyright protects only the author's original con-
tributions-not the facts or information conveyed." 4 ' "The
copyright in a compilation... extends only to the material
contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from
the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not
imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material."4'
a. A Feisty Court in Feist Publications
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.
42
is the seminal case regarding the requisite level of originality
required for receiving copyright protection in a compilation.
In summary, Rural Telephone Service Company ("Rural") ob-
135. See Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 357. ("What makes it significant is
that it is not the sole requirement. It is not enough for copyright purposes that
an author collects and assembles facts.").
136. See id.
137. See id. at 358 (offering that this is a straightforward application of the
originality requirement because facts are never original so the only chance for
originality is in the presentation); see also Matthew Bender & Co., 158 F.3d at
682-83.
The creative spark is missing where: (i) industry conventions or other
external factors so dictate selection that any person composing a com-
pilation of the type at issue would necessarily select the same catego-
ries of information ... or (ii) the author made obvious, garden-variety,
or routine selections .... In sum, creativity in selection and arrange-
ment therefore is a function of (i) the total number of options available,
(ii) external factors that limit the viability of certain options and render
others non-creative, and (iii) prior uses that render certain selections
"garden variety."
Id. (citations omitted).
138. Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 358.
139. Id. at 340.
140. Id. at 359.
141. Id. (emphasis added) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1994)); see also Matthew
Bender & Co., 158 F.3d at 687.
142. Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 340.
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tained data for its directory from its subscribers14 and pub-
lished a typical telephone directory consisting of white pages
and yellow pages.'" Feist Publications extracted listings from
Rural's directory without Rural's consent. 1 5 Rural sued Feist
for copyright infringement based on Feist's use of the infor-
mation contained in Rural's white pages. 4 6 Both the district
court and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that
Rural's telephone directories were copyrightable. 7 On certio-
rari, Justice O'Connor noted regarding compilations, "[iut is
this bedrock principle of copyright that mandates the law's
seemingly disparate treatment of facts and factual compila-
tions." 8 Unlike mere facts, factual compilations may possess
the requisite originality for copyright protection.'
The compilation author typically chooses which facts to in-
clude, in what order to place them, and how to arrange the
collected data so that they may be used effectively by
readers. These choices as to selection and arrangement,
so long as they meet the independence and creativity re-
quirements, are sufficiently original that Congress may
protect such compilations through the copyright laws."
As discussed below, despite the fact that factual compilations
143. See id. at 343.
144. See id. at 342.
145. See id.
Feist began by removing several thousand listings that fell outside the
geographic range of its area-wide directory, then hired personnel to in-
vestigate the 4,935 that remained. These employees verified the data
reported by Rural and sought to obtain additional information ...
1309 of the 46,878 listings in Feist's 1983 directory were identical to
listings in Rural's 1982-1983 white pages. Four of these were fictitious
listings that Rural had inserted into its directory to detect copying.
Id. at 343-44.
146. See id. at 344.
147. See Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 916 F.2d 718 (10th
Cir. 1990); Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214, 218
(D. Kan. 1987).
148. Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 347 (offering that census takers, for ex-
ample, do not "create" the population figures that emerge from their efforts; in a
sense, they copy these figures from the world around them) (citing Robert C.
Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Non-
fiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516, 525 (1981)).
149. See id. at 348.
150. Id. (citing NIMMER, supra note 64, §§ 2.11[D], at 3.03). "Thus, even a
directory that contains absolutely no protectible written expression, only facts,
meets the constitutional minimum for copyright protection if it features an
original selection or arrangement." Id. See also, e.g., Kregos v. Associated
Press, 937 F.2d 700, 703 (2d Cir. 1991).
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are copyrightable, the Feist court nevertheless found that Ru-
ral's white pages lacked the requisite originality necessary for
copyright protection.
b. Elusive Expression-The "Thin Copyright"
The expressive element is more elusive where the com-
pilation author "lets the facts speak for themselves," rather
than adding any written expression.' "The only conceivable
expression is the manner in which the compiler has selected
and arranged the facts. Thus, if the selection and arrange-
ment are original, these elements of the work are eligible for
copyright protection."'52 This has been termed a "thin copy-
right."
153
c. The Death of "Sweat of the Brow"
The theory of "sweat of the brow" or "industrious collec-
tion," ' a concept premised on the notion that an author
should be rewarded primarily for effort, likewise cannot es-
151. See Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 349.
152. Id. See William F. Patry, Copyright in Compilations of Facts (or Why
the 'White Pages" Are Not Copyrightable), 12 COM. & LAw 37, 64 (Dec. 1990).
No matter how original the format, however, the facts themselves do not become
original through association. See Patterson & Joyce, supra note 62, at 776; see
also Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 674, 688-89 (2d Cir.
1998) (explaining that "our decisions establish a low threshold of creativity,
even in works involving selection from among facts").
153. Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 349 ("This inevitably means that the
copyright in a factual compilation is thin .... A subsequent compiler remains
free to use the facts contained in another's publication to aid in preparing a
competing work, so long as the competing work does not feature the same selec-
tion and arrangement."). See generally David Luettgen, Functional Usefulness
vs. Communicative Usefulness: Thin Copyright Protection for the Nonliteral
Elements of Computer Programs, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 233, 234 (1996) (ex-
plaining how copyright started off broad but is getting thinner); Dale Olson,
Thin Copyrights, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 147, 157 (1992) (exploring Feist's role in es-
tablishing "thin copyright").
154. The classic formulation of "sweat of the brow" was embodied in Jeweler's
Circular Publ'g Co. v. Keystone Publ'g Co., 281 F. 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1922). Circuit
Judge Rogers stated:
The right to copyright a book upon which one has expended labor in its
preparation does not depend upon whether the materials which he has
collected consist or not of matters which are publici juris, or whether
such materials show literary skill or originality, either in thought or in
language, or anything more than industrious collection. The man who
goes through the streets of a town and puts down the names of each of
the inhabitants, with their occupations and their street number, ac-
quires material of which he is the author.
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cape the prerequisite of originality.' 5 Proof of effort, even in
vast degrees, does not alone establish that even a modicum of
originality exists in the work."6 A painstaking copy still re-
mains a copy, regardless of the effort involved in its creation.
Even under the 1909 Act, "sweat of the brow" did not alone
provide sufficient justification for copyright protection."7 In
International News Service v. Associated Press,"' the Court
held that the 1909 Act conferred copyright protection only on
those elements of a work original to the author."9 The stan-
dard of originality may be low, but it does exist. 6 '
With respect to Rural's white pages, the Court held that
the selection, coordination, and arrangement of the materials
did not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for
copyright protection.' The Court determined that Rural
merely gathered the data provided by its subscribers and
listed the information alphabetically by surname to produce a
garden-variety white pages directory, devoid of even the
slightest trace of creativity. 162 Even though the directory rep-
resents a "selection" of a sort, "it lacks the modicum of crea-
tivity necessary to transform mere selection into copy-
rightable expression.
163
Because Rural's white pages lacked the requisite origi-
nality, Feist's use of the listings did not constitute infringe-
ment.' As a reprieve, the Court admonished the parties that
its decision "should not be construed as demeaning Rural's ef-
forts in compiling its directory, but rather as making clear
that copyright rewards originality, not effort.""'
With Justice O'Connor's wisdom in mind, one may con-
155. See Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 352-53.
156. See id. at 359-60.
157. See id. at 353 (offering that the "[diecisions of this Court applying the
1909 Act make clear that the statute did not permit the 'sweat of the brow' ap-
proach").
158. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
159. See id. at 235.
160. See Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 362 (citing Patterson & Joyce, supra
note 62, at 760, n.144 (stating "[wihile this requirement is sometimes charac-
terized as modest, or a low threshold, it is not without effect") (internal quota-
tion marks omitted; citations omitted)).
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. Id. at 362-63 ("Rural expended sufficient effort to make the white pages
directory useful, but insufficient creativity to make it original.").
164. See id. at 364.
165. Id. (emphasis added).
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template the issue of whether conventional interpretation of
the law involving compilations remains consistent when con-
sidering the other "second generation" work, derivative
works. Faced with a distinct variation in analysis depending
upon the public domain status of the underlying work, courts
struggle to resolve whether such distinction warrants dispa-
rate treatment in derivative work cases.
2. Derivative Works
A derivative work exists as a functional variation of a
preexisting work that is either protected by copyright or in
the public domain.'66 The use of public domain material does
not preclude a finding of originality because "[alnyone can
copyright anything, if he or she adds something original to its
expression." 7 Regardless of the nature of the underlying
work, originality remains essential to a derivative work.66
The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101, defines a derivative
work as:
[A] work based upon one or more preexisting works, such
as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fic-
tionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form
in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.
A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations,
elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole,
represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative
work. 169
The scope of copyright protection of a derivative work, how-
ever, extends only to the material contributed by the author
of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting mate-
rial.7 '
166. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). "A 'derivative work,' on the other hand, requires
a process of recasting, transforming, or adapting 'one or more preexisting
works'; the 'preexisting work' must come within the general subject matter of
copyright set forth in section 102, regardless of whether it is or was ever copy-
righted." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 2, at 57-58.
167. Kamar Int'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir.
1981).
168. See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.
1976); NIMMER, supra note 64, § 3.03.
169. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110
(9th Cir. 1998) ("The statutory language is hopelessly overbroad, however, for
'[elvery book in literature, science and art, borrows and must necessarily bor-
row, and use much which was well known and used before."') (citations omitted).
170. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b).
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The term "derivative work" is in some sense redundant.
All works might be considered derivative in that they em-
ploy previously existing elements. One cannot write with-
out using letters or language, paint without colors and
forms, or compose without notes and structures that have
been previously created. Even where preceded by no mor-
tal hand or eye, the sculptor may employ the grain of the
wood or the composer may seek to integrate the babble of
a brook. Of course, drawing from a common stock of ele-
ments is not what makes for a derivative work under the
statute or as the term is commonly used.'7'
Despite the dichotomy involved in "second generation"
works between compilation and derivative works, courts con-
sistently apply the originality standard. In the wake of court
decisions like Feist Publications, the question forms as to how
much originality is necessary. In order to appreciate the
evolving complexity of the issue, this article considers a thor-
ough, fact-specific analysis of the court interpretations of the
quantum of originality necessary to receive protection in a de-
rivative work.
III. THE NECESSARY QUANTUM OF ORIGINALITY IN
DERIVATIVE WORKS
After exploring the cases that transformed the originality
requirement for derivative works into the mutating target
that it is today, this article investigates the present relation-
ship between the public domain status of the underlying work
and the quantum of originality necessary to achieve protec-
tion of a derivative work. Finally, to achieve greater equality
among the treatment of derivative works, this article humbly
offers a unification of the quantum of originality for all de-
rivative works, regardless of the public domain status of the
underlying work.
A. A "More Than Merely Trivial" Minimum in Bleistein
To attain copyright protection, a derivative work must
demonstrate sufficient originality by evidencing a "distin-
guishable variation" from the prior work, where such varia-
tion is the product of the author's independent effort and
171. Phillip Page, The Works: Distinguishing Derivative Creations under
Copyright, 5 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 415, 418 (1986) (citing Reyher v. Chil-
dren's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1976)).
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quantified as more than merely trivial.172 In order for a work
to be copyrightable, it must result from certain minimal levels
of creativity and originality. '73 Justice Holmes described this
concept in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. 4
The dispute in Bleistein involved the copying of three
chromolithographs portraying a lifelike scene from a privately
owned circus. The chromolithographs expressed three ordi-
nary circus scenes: one of a ballet, one of a number of men
and women performing on bicycles, and one of groups of men
and women whitened to represent statues."6 When consid-
ering originality with regard to circus performers, whose per-
formances were in the public domain, Justice Holmes stated:
Personality always contains something unique. It ex-
presses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very
modest grade of art has in it something irreducible which
is one man's alone. The something he may copyright un-
less there is a restriction in the words of the act.
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the
worth of pictorial illustrations .... At the one extreme,
some works of genius would be sure to miss apprecia-
tion.... At the other end, copyright would be denied to
pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the
judge.... We are of opinion that there was evidence that
the plaintiffs have rights entitled to the protection of the
law. 1
77
Justice Holmes propounded a basic threshold. 7  This
threshold, however, does not fully embody the quantum of
originality necessary to receive copyright protection. The
court interpretation of this originality requirement focused on
whether a derivative work's underlying work is in the public
domain. 
1
7
172. See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d
Cir. 1951).
173. See id.; see also supra Part I.B.3-4.
174. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).
175. Id. at 248.
176. See id.
177. Id at 250-52. (emphasis added) (extolling the dangers for the legal sys-
tem to make artistic judgments).
178. See id.
179. See id. at 248-52.
2000]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
B. Applying the Baseline to Public Domain Derivatives
1. "More Than Trivial" Additions in Alfred Bell & Co.
Applying Bleistein's reasoning to a derivative work based
on the public domain, Circuit Judge Frank breathed life into
this minimum level and established the "more than trivial"
standard in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.8°
Judge Frank literally and figuratively put Justice Holmes's
words to the test. Alfred Bell & Co. ("Bell") created reproduc-
tions of paintings by old masters in the public domain using a
special engraving process known as mezzotint. 8' Bell sued
Catalda Fine Arts ("Catalda"), claiming infringement of eight
mezzotints.'82 Catalda argued that the mezzotints lacked
originality, being merely reproductions of public domain
works, and, therefore, were not copyrightable.8 3
Judge Frank held that originality in copyright requires
"little more than a prohibition of actual copying. No matter
how poor the 'author's' addition, it is enough if it be his
own."18 4 Thus, in general, it follows that if any author's inde-
pendent efforts contain sufficient skill to motivate another's
copying, there is ipso facto a sufficient quantum of originality
to support a copyright.'85
Despite this slight quantum threshold, which accepts
even the most modest amount of originality as sufficient,'86
there are works that cannot demonstrate more than trivial or
insignificant efforts.' 7 Moreover, trivial efforts usually do not
encompass unintentional efforts, therefore establishing that
the quantum of originality requires not only proof of at least
some original effort, but also requires proof of some degree of
intention to produce an original result. Circuit Judge Frank
explained that unintentional actions could, at times, consti-
180. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
181. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 973, 975
(S.D.N.Y. 1947), affd, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
182. See id.
183. See Alfred Bell & Co., 191 F.2d at 104.
184. Id. at 103; see Entertainment Research Group v. Genesis Creative
Group, Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1221 (9th Cir. 1997).
185. See NIMMER, supra note 64, § 2.01[B], at 2-14 (citing Drop Dead Co. v.
S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 326 F.2d 87, 92 (9th Cir. 1963)).
186. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
345 (1991).
187. See id. at 358; Magic Mktg., Inc. v. Mailing Servs. of Pittsburgh, Inc.,
634 F. Supp. 769, 771 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
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tute originality, while under other circumstances inadvertent
independent efforts could render a work devoid of the requi-
site quantum of originality. '88 "A copyist's bad eyesight or de-
fective musculature, or a shock caused by a clap of thunder,
may yield sufficiently distinguishable variations. Having hit
upon such a variation unintentionally, the 'author' may adopt
it as his and copyright it."'89 However, some inadvertent "ef-
forts" fail to yield this distinction. For example "[s]etting fire
to the Louvre might well transform many preexisting works
beyond recognition, much less beyond trivial variation. But
unless arson were considered the writing of an 'author,' the
damaged fragments might not properly be regarded as de-
rivative works."190
Additionally, though some works cannot demonstrate
enough independent effort to fulfill this minimal level of
originality, "even the most commonplace and banal results of
independent effort may command copyright protection." 9' At
the same time, copyright law will not vehemently protect
merely trivial variations of public domain material.9 ' The
courts have defined the necessary quantum of authorship
using terms such as "a modicum," "a minimum," or "an appre-
ciable amount" of original, creative expression.'93 Even ex-
pressions as commonplace as a three-dimensional Santa
Claus still command protection, as illustrated in Doran v.
Sunset House Distributing Corp. 94
188. See Alfred Bell & Co., 191 F.2d at 104.
189. Id. at 105 (emphasis added). See Florabelle Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph
Markovits, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 304, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding that the acci-
dentally or laboriously contrived may be equally protectable). Cf. Kuddle Toy,
Inc. v. Pussy-Cat Toy Co., 183 U.S.P.Q. 642, 642 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (denying pro-
tection to "a trifling variation, perhaps the result of imperfect copying . . ").
190. Page, supra note 171, at 420 n.51 (citing Goldstein v. California, 412
U.S. 546, 561 (1972)); see also id. at 420 n.52 (rejecting the proposal that this
problem could be dismissed as unlawful use under 17 U.S.C. § 103(a)).
191. NIMMER, supra note 64, § 2.01[B], at 2-16 (citing Heim v. Universal Pic-
tures Corp, Inc., 154 F.2d 480, 488 n.17 (2d Cir. 1946)); see Drop Dead Co. v.
S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 326 F.2d 87, 93 (9th Cir. 1963).
192. See Copyrightability of Digitized Typefaces, 51 Fed. Reg. 36,410, 36,411
(1986) (to be codified at 37 CFR pt. 202).
193. Id.
194. Doran v. Sunset House Distrib., 197 F. Supp. 940 (S.D. Cal. 1961), affd,
304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962).
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2. Saving Santa with Doran
In Doran v. Sunset House Distributing Corp.,' ' Doran
manufactured a red plastic bag that, after being filled with
crumpled newspaper, looked like a three-dimensional Santa
Claus for display as a Christmas decoration. 96 Two years af-
ter Doran started selling this product,'97 Sunset House started
selling similar Santa Clauses packed with similar instruc-
tions.198 During the ensuing lawsuit, the defendants conceded
that by Doran's product "inspired" them.'99
Sunset House argued that "since Santa Claus is in the
public domain, a work of art embodying this legendary figure
cannot be the subject of a valid copyright."2 °° As Circuit Judge
Chambers explained on appeal, "Santa Claus belongs to the
whole world, and next he may be exported to outer space. He
belongs to none of the parties.""' However, district court
Judge Byrne held that, "[tihe fact that a copyrighted article
depicts a figure, theme or idea in the public domain, does not
in itself void the copyright."2 2 The analysis in this case dealt
expressly with the determination of whether this medium of
expression-a tangible representation of the familiar figure of
Santa Claus in a three-dimensional, plastic form-sufficiently
displayed original thought and creation to support the grant
of protection under copyright law.20'
Judge Byrne stated "[t]o be copyrightable, a work must
be 'original' in that the author has created it by his own skill,
labor and judgment."2 4 Using Alfred Bell & Co.'s "merely triv-
195. Id.
196. See id. at 942.
197. See id. at 943.
198. See id. ("The first shipment of Santas received for distribution from
American Cover [the manufacturer of the Santas sold by Sunset House] in-
cluded an instruction sheet bearing the name 'Plasti-Personalities.' Officials of
defendant American Cover have no explanation as to how this name came to
appear on their instruction sheet.").
199. See id. ("Mr. Tashman of defendant American Cover admitted having
obtained one of plaintiffs' Santa Claus figures and testified that it might have
been secured from Mr. Carlson of defendant Sunset House.").
200. Doran, 197 F. Supp. at 944.
201. Doran, 304 F.2d at 252.
202. Doran, 197 F. Supp. at 944 (emphasis added).
203. See id.
204. Id. (citing Dorsey v. Old Sur. Life Ins. Co., 98 F.2d 872, 873 (10th Cir.
1938); Smith v. George E. Muehlebach Brewing Co., 140 F. Supp. 729, 731
(W.D. Mo. 1956)).
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ial" variation standard,2"5 the court held that because Doran
"first envisioned, and then created by their own skill, labor
and judgment, a Santa Claus in the form of a three-
dimensional figure made of plastic,"2  Doran's product was
sufficiently original. "[T]he originality here lies in the form-
three-dimensional-and the medium-plastic-which plain-
tiffs used to express the idea of Santa Claus. As far as the re-
cord reveals, plaintiffs were the first to reproduce the tradi-
tional character in this particular form and medium. 2 7
Based on these facts, Judge Byrne held that Doran's Santa
represented an "'original' [creation] because of its form and
medium, and this originality is sufficient to form the basis of
a valid copyright."2 '
C. Raising the Bar When the Underlying Work is Still
Protected
1. Winding Down Mickey, Donald, and Pluto in Durham
Industries
Saving Santa Claus generated criticism from a case that
considered the other type of derivative works: those based on
underlying works still protected, but not belonging to the
public domain. In Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corpora-
tion,'°9 Tomy Corporation asserted nine counterclaims210
against Durham Industries for copying eight pairs of Tomy's
toys, 211 three of which were Disney figures and five of which
were other miscellaneous toys. 212 Tomy claimed the copyright
on three wind-up plastic Disney figures: Mickey Mouse, Don-
205. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir.
1951) (emphasis added).
206. Doran, 197 F. Supp. at 944.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 945.
209. Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 907 (2d Cir. 1980).
210. See id. at 907-08. Eight counterclaims alleged copyright infringement;
the ninth alleged unfair competition under both the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a), and state law in regard to the eight Tomy products. See id.
211. See id. at 907. In January of 1979, Tomy accused Durham of systemati-
cally copying eight Tomy toys and threatened to take legal action if the matter
was not immediately resolved by other means. Beating Tomy to court, in Feb-
ruary of 1979, Durham filed an action against Tomy seeking a declaratory
judgment to the effect that in marketing its line of toys, Durham had violated
no legal rights of Tomy. See id.
212. See id. at 908.
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ald Duck, and Pluto."3 Durham manufactured and distrib-
uted virtually indistinguishable versions of these Disney fig-
ures. Durham admitted that they used Tomy's Disney figures
as models in the creation of the Durham products.2"4 As a re-
sult, Tomy asserted that Durham infringed upon Tomy's ex-
clusive right to copy its own creations.2"5
As a threshold matter, Circuit Judge Meskill stated that
"a party must demonstrate the existence and the validity of
its copyright, for in the absence of copyright ... protection,
even original creations are in the public domain and may be
freely copied."' Holding transformation of an existing recog-
nizable form from one media to another alone provides insuf-
ficient grounds for supporting a copyright, Meskill deemed
Tomy's copyrights on the three Disney figures invalid.' "The
three Tomy figures are instantly identifiable as embodiments
of the Disney characters in yet another form: Mickey, Donald
and Pluto are now represented as small, plastic, wind-up
toys .218
One look at Tomy's figures reveals that, in each, the ele-
ment of originality that is necessary to support a valid
copyright is totally lacking. For half a century or so Dis-
ney's characters have peered at us from movie screens,
comic books, television sets, posters, clothing, watches,
dolls, and a variety of other media, and it would be safe to
say that they have a recognition factor that any politician
or celebrity would envy."'
Neither party contested that Walt Disney created and owns
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. Durham Indus., 630 F.2d at 908.
216. Id. at 908 (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225
(1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Goldstein
v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1972)). "In many cases, the existence of a valid
copyright can be established by the introduction into evidence of a Copyright
Office certificate of registration. Such a certificate, if timely obtained, 'consti-
tute(s) prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts
stated in the certificate."' Id. (clarifying that a certificate of registration creates
no irrebuttable presumption of copyright validity).
217. See id.
218. Id. at 909.
219. Id. at 908-09 (emphasis added) (citing Sid & Marty Krofft Television
Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1171 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding
that Mickey Mouse is recognized worldwide); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates,
345 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (holding that Disney characters are instantly
recognizable), affd in part, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978)).
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the underlying works in the three characters.220  Judge
Meskill explained that the classification of these items as de-
rivative works bore no relation to the copyright law analysis
and certainly did not create a de facto bar to copyrightabil-
ity.221  Nonetheless, copyright law does subject derivative
works to two important and related limitations.
First, to support a copyright the original aspects of a de-
rivative work must be more than trivial. Second, the scope of
protection afforded a derivative work must reflect the degree
to which it relies on preexisting material and must not in any
way affect the scope of any copyright protection in that pre-
existing material.222
Based on this two-part test, Judge Meskill deduced that
"the only aspects of Tomy's Disney figures entitled to copy-
right protection are the non-trivial, original features, if any,
contributed by the author or creator of these derivative
works., 22  Judge Meskill cited an earlier decision from the
Second Circuit, L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder.224  Though
Batlin dealt with the concepts of originality and triviality as
they applied to a derivative work based on an article in the
public domain,225 Judge Meskill held that "the standard an-
nounced in Batlin by which the copyrightability of a deriva-
tive work is to be determined is fully applicable" to "preex-
isting works [that] are themselves the subjects of copyrights
and are therefore not in the public domain. 226
Judge Meskill focused on the Batlin court's explicit re-
fusal to infer originality in the mere reproduction of a work of
art in a different medium or by the demonstration of some
"physical," as opposed to "artistic," skill.227 Finding no copy-
rightability, the Durham Industries court declined to follow
Doran. In doing so, Durham Industries seemed to establish
220. See id. at 909.
221. See Durham Indus., 630 F.2d at 909 ("Derivative works are explicitly
included in the subject matter of copyright as defined by the Copyright Act.")
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1994)).
222. See id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 103).
223. Id.
224. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc).
225. See Durham Indus., 630 F.2d at 909.
226. Id.
227. See id. at 910 (citing L. Batlin & Son, 536 F.2d at 491).
228. Doran v. Sunset House Distrib. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940, 944 (S.D. Cal.
1961), affd, 304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962) (holding first reproduction of tradi-
tional Santa Claus character in three-dimensional form and plastic medium
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an alternative analysis for derivative works based on copy-
righted materials as opposed to those based on information in
the public domain. Judge Meskill held:
[Tihe mere reproduction of the Disney characters in plas-
tic, even though the adaptation of the preexisting works to
this medium undoubtedly involved some degree of manu-
facturing skill, does not constitute originality as this Court
has defined the term. Tomy has demonstrated, and the
toys themselves reflect, no independent creation, no dis-
tinguishable variation from preexisting works, nothing
recognizably the author's own contribution that sets
Tomy's figures apart from the prototypical Mickey, Don-
ald, and Pluto, authored by Disney and subsequently rep-
resented by Disney or its licensees in a seemingly limitless
variety of forms and media.29
Any less of a standard "would simply put a weapon for
harassment in the hands of mischievous copiers. .,2" Rec-
ognizing that this case examined derivative works based on
protected underlying works, Judge Meskill stated,
In the instant case, our concern is with carrying out the
statutory command that protection of a derivative work
not affect the scope of copyright protection in an underlying
work. If we were to recognize Tomy's derivative copy-
rights in its figures, those who, like Durham, have ob-
tained from Disney the right to copy Disney's own charac-
ters would, as a practical matter, have to make substantial
changes in these characters in order to avoid infringing
Tomy's rights.... Thus it is clear that the originality re-
quirement imposed by the Constitution and the Copyright
Act has particular significance in the case of derivative
works based on copyrighted preexisting works.81
held sufficiently original to support copyright).
229. Durham Indus, 630 F.2d at 910 (emphasis added) (citing L. Batlin &
Son, 536 F.2d at 490; Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102-
03, 105 (2d Cir. 1951)).
230. Id. (citing L. Batlin & Son, 536 F.2d at 492).
231. Id. at 910-11 (emphasis added). Judge Meskill added:
In theory, of course, there would be no infringement of Tomy's rights if
Durham copied Disney's characters and not Tomy's figures ... but be-
cause proof of access plus substantial similarity can support a finding
of infringement, Durham would at the very least be vulnerable to har-
assment. Yet any significant changes made by Durham to avoid liabil-
ity would carry it away from the original Disney characters, in which
Tomy concededly has no copyrights, and Disney's right to copy (or to
permit others to copy) its own creations would, in effect, be circum-
scribed.
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Based on this reasoning, Circuit Judge Meskill concluded that
Tomy's Disney figures lacked "even a modest degree of origi-
nality," finding the work not copyrightable.232
2. Working Durham Industries's Test in Weissmann
Courts continually apply Durham Industries's two-part
test, as the Second Circuit did when it considered the profes-
sor/assistant relationship in Weissmann v. Freeman.233 How-
ever, Weissmann demonstrates that the Durham Industries
two-part test does not savagely preclude the formation of de-
rivative works simply because the underlying work still en-
joys copyright protection. 4
Dr. Heidi Weissmann and Dr. Leonard Freeman formed
their professional relationship in 1977.235 Beginning in 1980,
they worked together as researchers and co-authors of a
number of papers focusing on various aspects of nuclear
medicine, particularly iminodiacetic acid imaging.236 In 1985,
Weissmann authored an article entitled "Hepatobiliary Im-
aging, (P-i)" ("P-I") and reported on a relatively new diag-
nostic technique employing radioactive analogs of the agent
iminodiacetic acid.237 As opposed to strictly independent
authorship, Weissmann derived this paper from a virtually
verbatim culmination of previous papers jointly written by
the parties during the course of their professional relation-
ship.238
In response to an invitation to present a review course on
nuclear medicine in the summer of 1987, Freeman used
Weissmann's P-1, replacing her name with his own and add-
Id. at 911 (citations omitted).
232. Id. The copyrights in the miscellaneous toys were valid.
233. Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1989).
234. See id.
235. See id. at 1315.
236. See id. at 1315-16.
237. See id. at 1316.
238. See id.
Although P-1 appears to restate the central propositions asserted in the
prior works, Weissmann's exhibits include the following new elements:
(1) a new selection of photo illustrations and associated captions; (2)
references to four recent reports in the pertinent literature; (3) new
textual additions; and (4) reorganization of previous material. [Free-
man] conceded at trial that this material in P-1 was created solely by
[Weissmann].
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ing three words to the title.9 Prior to the beginning of the
course, Weissmann requested that her revised article not be
circulated.24 ° Freeman acquiesced to the removal of the arti-
cle from the packet of course materials and delivered his lec-
ture not only without including materials added to P-1 by
Weissmann, but also without including excerpts from the por-
tion of P-1 for which he could be accredited authorship.241
Nonetheless, Weissmann filed suit alleging copyright in-
fringement.242
The district court concluded that Freeman's use of P-1
did not violate any of Weissmann's rights.24 The court held
that certain materials contained within P-1 could be attrib-
uted solely to Weissmann's efforts, but constituted too trivial
an addition to qualify for protection as a derivative work un-
der the copyright statute.2 On appeal, Circuit Judge Car-
damone addressed this issue.245
Since Freeman admitted to copying the article, the only
question remaining to establish a claim of copyright in-
fringement involved "whether Dr. Weissmann owned a valid
copyright in a so-called derivative work."2 46  Citing Durham
Industries's two-part test, Judge Cardamone addressed the
originality requirement in derivative works.2 7 Following Al-
fred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.,245 Judge Cardamone
explained that "[a]ll that is needed to satisfy both the Consti-
239. See Weissmann, 868 F.2d at 1316. Fifty copies of the article were made.
See id.
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. See id. at 1316. Weissmann requested a declaration that Freeman had
committed actionable infringement, an injunction permanently restraining him
from infringing, and an award of actual damages and profits. See id.
243. See id. (citing Weissmann v. Freeman, 684 F. Supp. 1248, 1260
(S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
244. See id. (adding that even were Freeman not a joint author of the alleg-
edly infringed work, and even were P-i's new matter copyrightable, Freeman's
purported use of P-1 was a fair use within the purview of § 107 of the Copyright
Act) (citing Weissmann, 684 F. Supp. at 1261-62).
245. See Weissmann, 868 F.2d at 1313.
246. Id. at 1320-21 ("Although [Weissmann's] certificate of registration 'con-
stitute[s] prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts
stated in the certificate,' it is not conclusive on the issue of copyrightability; it
merely creates a presumption of validity.") (citing 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1994);
Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 908 (2d Cir. 1980); Past Pluto
Prods. Corp. v. Dana, 627 F. Supp. 1435, 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
247. See id.
248. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
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tution and the statute is that the 'author' contributed some-
thing more than a 'merely trivial' variation, something recog-
nizably 'his own.' 249 The originality requirement for a revised
version represents a "minimal" or "modest" original addi-
tion. 50
District Judge Pollack believed that "the update was
done as part of the evolution of the stock piece" and that
Weissmann's modifications of the preexisting joint works did
not warrant copyright protection.251 Circuit Judge Cardamone
criticized this belief by opining, "the district court implausibly
overlooked the fact that appellant's 1985 selection of subject
matter and content drawn from prior works and their rear-
rangement in P-1 is sufficiently the product of original
authorship to warrant copyright protection.29 2  Based on
these sources of originality, "Dr. Weissmann's additions and
modifications to the preexisting joint work satisfy the modest
requirements set forth in § 103(b) and in the relevant case
law sufficiently to make P-1 entitled to copyright protection
as a derivative work."
253
Weissmann typifies the complex issues facing courts in
the arena of derivative works. More importantly, the analysis
also proves that the two-part test in Durham Industries has
the capacity to provide guidance in determining the original-
ity required in a derivative work based on a protected under-
lying work. While capable of producing diametrically oppo-
site conclusions, as shown by comparing Durham Industries
to Weissmann, the sliding scale approach to originality pro-
vides courts with flexibility. Despite the prolific use of the
Durham Industries two-part test, some courts promote a more
stringent standard to receive copyright protection in a deriva-
tive work.
D. Propelling the Standard to New Heights
In contrast to the established test in Durham Industries,
249. Weissmann, 868 F.2d at 1321 (emphasis added) (citing Alfred Bell & Co.,
191 F.2d at 102-03).
250. See id.
251. Id. at 1322 (explaining that the district court concluded that P-1 and its
predecessors had evolved over an extended period of time and that Weissmann's
additions were minuscule, demonstrating little originality) (citing Weissman v.
Freeman, 684 F. Supp. 1248, 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1323.
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some courts require a higher standard of originality for de-
rivative works if based on protected underlying works. Cir-
cuit Judge Posner's decision in Gracen v. Bradford Ex-
change.4 exhibits a demand for what may ultimately prove
too high of a quantum of originality.
1. Going Too Far with Gracen's "Substantial Difference"
In 1939, MGM produced and copyrighted the movie "The
Wizard of Oz."25 In 1976, MGM licensed Bradford Exchange
to use characters and scenes from the movie in a series of
collectors' plates."' Bradford Exchange invited several artists
to submit paintings of Dorothy as played by Judy Garland,
with the understanding that the artist submitting the best
painting would be offered a contract for the entire series.257
Jorie Gracen produced a painting of Dorothy as played by
Judy Garland."' A shopping center exhibited Gracen's
painting along with the other contestants' paintings for
passersby to select a winner.5 Though Gracen won, she re-
fused to sign Bradford Exchange's contract.26 ° Bradford Ex-
change then employed a non-competitor, James Auckland,
and furnished him Gracen's painting to assist him in prepar-
ing his painting of Dorothy.26'
Gracen, after obtaining a copyright registration on her
painting, sued MGM, Bradford, Auckland, and the manufac-
turer of the plates for copyright infringement.2 62 The district
court granted summary judgment against Gracen because she
could not copyright her paintings and drawings as they were
not original.263 The court further assessed Gracen as an in-
254. Gracen v. Bradford Exchange, 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983).
255. See id. at 301.
256. See id.
257. See id. Bradford supplied each artist with photographs from the movie
and with instructions for the painting that included the following: "We do want
your interpretation of these images, but your interpretation must evoke all the
warm feeling the people have for the film and its actors. So, your Judy/Dorothy
must be very recognizable as everybody's Judy/Dorothy." Id.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See Gracen, 698 F.2d at 301.
261. See id. at 301.
262. See id. at 302. MGM and Bradford counterclaimed, alleging among
other things that Gracen had infringed the copyright on the movie by showing
her drawings and a photograph of her painting to people whom she was solicit-
ing for artistic commissions. See id.
263. See id.
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fringer of MGM's copyright.26 4
Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, focused on
"whether there [was] enough difference between the deriva-
tive and the underlying work to satisfy the statutory re-
quirement of originality."265 He explained that "the concept of
originality in copyright law has as one would expect a legal
rather than aesthetic function-to prevent overlapping
claims."266 Demonstrating a very result-oriented approach,
Judge Posner analogized:
Suppose Artist A produces a reproduction of the Mona
Lisa, a painting in the public domain, which differs
slightly from the original. B also makes a reproduction of
the Mona Lisa. A, who has copyrighted his derivative
work, sues B for infringement. B's defense is that he was
copying the original, not A's reproduction. But if the dif-
ference between the original and A's reproduction is
slight, the difference between A's and B's reproductions
will also be slight, so that if B had access to A's reproduc-
tions the trier of fact will be hard-pressed to decide
whether B was copying A or copying the Mona Lisa it-
self.
2 67
Extending this analogy, Judge Posner conceded that
there were "perceptible differences" between Gracen's paint-
ing and the underlying work,268 but ultimately concluded that:
[I]f the differences between Miss Gracen's painting of
Dorothy and the photograph of Judy Garland as Dorothy
were sufficient to make the painting original in the eyes of
the law, then a painting by an Auckland also striving, as
per his commission, to produce something "very recogniz-
able as everybody's Judy/Dorothy" would look like the
Gracen painting, to which he had access; and it would be
difficult for the trier of fact to decide whether Auckland
264. See id. The court entered judgment for $1500 on MGM and Bradford's
counterclaim. See id.
265. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994)). The court first decided whether
Bradford Exchange had granted Gracen the authority to create a derivative
work. See id. "[Pirotection for a work employing preexisting material in which
copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such mate-
rial has been used unlawfully." 17 U.S.C. § 103(a).
266. Gracen, 698 F.2d at 304 (citing L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d
486, 491-92 (2d Cir. 1976)).
267. Id. at 301 (emphasis added) (focusing on infringement instead of first
establishing originality).
268. See id. at 304.
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had copied her painting or the original movie stills. 69
So the court "simplified" the process by requiring "a suffi-
ciently gross difference between the underlying and the de-
rivative work to avoid entangling subsequent artists depict-
ing the underlying work in copyright problems."27 °
Employing this reasoning, had Gracen painted Judy
Garland from life, her painting would be copyrightable "even
if we thought it kitsch; but a derivative work must be sub-
stantially different from the underlying work to be copy-
rightable. Evidencing his obvious bias against derivative
works based on copyrighted underlying works, Judge Posner
commented that "we do not think the difference is enough to
allow her to copyright her painting even if, as we very much
doubt, she was authorized by Bradford to do so."''  Needless
to say, Gracen's vast departure from the accepted two-part
test in Durham Industries prompted criticism from commen-
tatorsY.
Four years later, perhaps recognizing the impact of the
Gracen holding, Posner retreated from Gracen's "substantial
269. Id. at 304-05 (emphasis added). But see Pinkham v. Sara Lee Corp.,
983 F.2d 824, 829 (8th Cir. 1992) (refusing to follow Judge Posner's reasoning in
Gracen).
270. Gracen, 698 F.2d at 305 (emphasis added) ("We are speaking, however,
only of the requirement of originality in derivative works. If a painter paints
from life, no court is going to hold that his painting is not copyrightable because
it is an exact photographic likeness.").
271. Id. (emphasis added) (relying on L. Batlin & Son, 536 F.2d at 491); see
Patterson & Joyce, supra note 62, at 763 n.157 (describing Judge Posner's "sub-
stantially different" test as peculiar).
272. Gracen, 698 F.2d at 305 (emphasis added); see Jaszi, supra note 8, at
460 n.12 (criticizing Judge Posner's holding).
273. Judge Posner's "peculiar" "substantial difference" test has elicited the
following response:
As the father of the "law and economics" movement, Judge Posner
should know better. The "law and economics" movement holds that
legal doctrine is essentially an instrument to serve and promote the
operation of free markets. Thus, the merit of any legal rule should be
evaluated in terms of whether it tends to promote the "efficient" allo-
cation of resources. Followers of the movement pride themselves on
their willingness to apply their methodology to all bodies of legal doc-
trine, including those that one might assume should properly be
shaped by non-economic considerations.
Quite apart from the fact that "law and economics" seems inimical
to the Romantic vision of "authorship," Judge Posner has specifically
questioned this aspect of Romanticism. Here, consciously or uncon-
sciously, he embraces it.
Jaszi, supra note 8, at 460 n.12 (citations omitted).
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difference" test in Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat
Press.274 The Saturday Evening Post Company granted Rum-
bleseat Press an exclusive license to manufacture porcelain
dolls derived from Norman Rockwell illustrations published
in the Saturday Evening Post.75 After the Saturday Evening
Post Company cancelled the license, Rumbleseat continued
making the dolls directly contrary to the terms of the license
agreement.7 6
Judge Posner, while citing Gracen,77 offered a different,
seemingly lower standard for the requisite quantum of origi-
nality in derivative works. He stated "[w]orks derived from
copyrighted material-'derivative works' as they are called-
are copyrightable provided the derivative work has some in-
cremental originality; the copyright in the derivative work is
limited to that increment."
278
2. Encouraging the Confusion in Entertainment
Research Group
Despite Posner's slight retreat in Saturday Evening Post,
some jurists remain undaunted by both criticism of the "sub-
stantial difference" test and the inauguration of the slightly
less imposing standard announced in Saturday Evening Post.
Allowing the heightened standard to continue unabated,
cases such as Entertainment Research Group, Inc., v. Genesis
271Creative Group, Inc. prove that novel elements of law, such
as Gracen's "substantial difference" test, sometimes prove
surprisingly difficult to dispel or erase once incorporated.28
For sixteen years, Entertainment Research Group, Inc.
(ERG) designed and manufactured three-dimensional inflat-
able costumes based on cartoon characters"' for use in pub-
274. Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, 816 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.
1987) (involving porcelain copies of Norman Rockwell illustrations).
275. See id. at 1192-93.
276. See id.
277. Gracen, 698 F.2d at 300.
278. Saturday Evening Post, 816 F.2d at 1193 (emphasis added) (citing 17
U.S.C. §§ 101, 103(b) (1994); Gracen, 698 F.2d at 304-05; Durham Indus., Inc. v.
Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1980)).
279. Entertainment Research Group, Inc., v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc.,
122 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 1997).
280. See id.
281. See id. at 1214. "For example, Pillsbury purchased 'Pillsbury Doughboy'
costumes, Toys "R" Us purchased 'Geoffrey the Giraffe' costumes, and Quaker
Oats Company purchased 'Cap'n Crunch' costumes." Id. at 1214 n.2.
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licity events, such as shopping mall openings."' Genesis
Creative Group, Inc. ("Genesis") sold ERG's products and per-
formed related repair and maintenance services on a commis-
sion basis for ERG.28 3 By September 1990, more than forty-
eight ERG-manufactured costumes representing thirteen dif-
ferent cartoon characters had apparently been sold and dis-
tributed by Genesis to at least nine different companies.284
Though ERG and Genesis disagreed concerning the spe-
cifics of how their business relationship came to an end,285
Genesis apparently entered into a formal business relation-
ship with Aerostar, an ERG competitor, to sell inflatable
walk-around costumes manufactured by Aerostar to Genesis's
customers. ' Amongst numerous related claims, ERG alleged
that Genesis infringed its copyrights in these costumes."7
While ERG urged the court to analyze the case in light of
the Doran test,288 Circuit Judge Rea refused, as "Doran in-
volved the copyrightability of a derivative work where the
282. See id. at 1214.
283. See id. at 1215.
284. See id.
285. See Entertainment Research Group, 122 F.3d at 1214-15.
ERG claims that Genesis secretly entered into an agreement with
Aerostar while the ERG-Genesis relationship was still alive and that
Genesis supplied Aerostar with ERG-made costumes and ERG's pro-
prietary information so that Aerostar could enter into the inflatable
costume industry and so that Genesis could get itself a better deal
through Aerostar. On its part, Genesis contends that it was forced to
end the relationship due to ERG's failure to produce and service cos-
tumes in the timely manner required by Genesis's customers. In any
event, on August 23, 1991, Genesis gave ERG written notice of the
termination of all future business relations.
Id.
286. See id. at 1215.
287. See id.
ERG... allege[d] that Genesis made misrepresentations about ERG's
prices and ability to provide requested services[,] . . .that Genesis en-
gaged in a variety of other schemes designed to disrupt ERG's business
relationships and to create a demand for Aerostar-manufactured cos-
tumes[,] .. .that Genesis provided Aerostar with examples of ERG-
manufactured costumes so that Aerostar could learn how to manufac-
ture the complicated and intricate costumes and so that Aerostar could
copy the costumes[,] ... that Aerostar employees ripped out and pasted
over ERG's copyright labels in ERG-manufactured costumes without
the approval and/or knowledge of ERG[, and] ... that Genesis and
Aerostar distributed advertising materials depicting
ERG-manufactured costumes without ERG's approval.
Id.
288. See id. at 1219.
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preexisting work belonged to the public domain" and was not
copyrighted. '89 The court stated that "[t]his difference is criti-
cal because in deciding whether to grant copyright protection
to a derivative work, courts must be concerned about the im-
pact such a derivative copyright will have on the copyright
privileges and rights of the owner of the underlying work."29
The court reasoned that the body of derivative copyright law
must balance between the holder of a copyright in the under-
lying work and the author of a work created by copying a sub-
stantial portion of that underlying work.29 ' Judge Rea con-
cluded "because the Doran test completely fails to take into
account the rights of the holder of the copyright for the un-
derlying work, the Doran test should not be applied to deter-
mine the copyrightability of a derivative work that is based
on a preexisting work that is itself copyrighted." '92
Rather, Judge Rea used the two-part test in Durham In-
dustries29 "to determine whether ERG's costumes are copy-
rightable as derivative works."294 Based on the assumption
that "any aspects of ERG's costumes that are purely func-
tional, utilitarian or mechanical will not be given any copy-
right protection,"295 Judge Rea deemed that "any artistic dif-
ferences in the costumes are merely trivial." '96 Though ERG
exercised a number of creative decisions in the development
of an efficient and successful manufacturing process for the
costumes,29 Judge Rea noted that "the courts and commenta-
tors seem to agree that making decisions that enable one to
reproduce or transform an already existing work into another
289. Id. (emphasis added).
290. Id. at 1219 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1994)).
291. See Entertainment Research Group, 122 F.3d at 1219 (citing, Durham
Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910-11 (2d Cir. 1980)).
292. Id. ("In addition, it is not clear that we ever adopted the Doran test since
our opinion affirming the district court's decision really focused on the similar-
ity between the Santa Claus products at issue, rather than on the different
'forms' of the products.").
293. Id. at 1220.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1221 (citing Fabrica Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 893
(9th Cir. 1983)).
296. Id. at 1222.
297. See Entertainment Research Group, 122 F.3d at 1222 ("The problem
with ERG's argument, however, is that originality is not present solely because
Mr. Breed placed a lot of thought and effort into figuring out how to transform
the two-dimensional copyrighted characters into three-dimensional inflatable
costumes.").
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medium or dimension-though perhaps quite difficult and in-
tricate decisions-is not enough to constitute the contribution
of something 'recognizably his own.""'29
Deciding that the differences in form, texture, and pro-
portionality stemmed from functional considerations, "these
so-called artistic differences are really nothing more than
changes necessitated by utilitarian concerns."299 Because
ERG's costumes were "instantly identifiable as embodiments"
of the underlying copyrighted characters in "yet another
form," the court concluded "that ERG's artistic contributions
were merely trivial contributions.""'
Up to this point, Judge Rea's reasoning encouraged a
peaceful slumber for Gracen's higher standard. Though dis-
criminating against derivative works based on the status of
the underlying work as either copyrighted or within the pub-
lic domain, Judge Rea had not resuscitated Gracen's result-
oriented reasoning. However, Judge Rea departed from this
approach when considering the district court's erroneous in-
terpretation of the second prong of Durham Industries's two-
part test.3 °1
In reconsidering the second prong of the Durham Indus-
tries two-part test, Judge Rea rationalized that the second
prong ensures that copyright protection is not afforded to de-
rivative works whose originality consists of merely trivial ad-
ditions.32 The court feared that granting copyright protection
to a derivative work virtually identical to the underlying work
would greatly interfere with the rights possessed by the
owner of the underlying copyrighted work. Specifically, the
owner of the derivative work, by virtue of that copyright,
could meaningfully control the destiny of both the derivative
work and the original underlying copyrighted work by deny-
298. Id.; see, e.g., NIMMER, supra note 64, § 2.08[C], at 2; see also, e.g., Gal-
lery House, Inc. v. Yi, 582 F. Supp. 1294, 1297 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
299. Entertainment Research Group, 122 F.3d at 1223.
300. Id. at 1223 (emphasis added).
301. See id. at 1219.
302. See id. at 1220 ("Section 103(b) mandates that the copyright protection
for derivative works not affect the scope of any copyright protection in the un-
derlying work. Copyright protection for underlying works would be affected-
and, thus, § 103(b) would be violated-if derivative works without adequate
originality were given copyright protection."). See, e.g., Gracen v. Bradford
Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304-05 (7th Cir. 1983); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp.,
630 F.2d 905, 910-11 (2d Cir. 1980); Moore Publ'g., Inc. v. Big Sky Mktg., 756 F.
Supp. 1371, 1374 (D. Idaho 1990).
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ing any other person the right to create a second derivative
work based on the same underlying original. The derivative
copyright holder would wield a de facto monopoly due to the
"considerable power to interfere with the creation of subse-
quent derivative works from the same underlying work.""3 3
Rather than allowing the original creator to approve or dis-
approve of the creation of derivative works from the under-
lying copyrighted item, as envisioned by the drafters of copy-
right law, this right would be shared between the original
author and the author of the derivative work. Such results
would not promote the goals of copyright law. Though a far
cry from the "substantial difference" test enunciated in Gra-
cen, Entertainment Research Group reinforces the pall of sus-
picion continually cast on derivative works based on protected
underlying works.
While the holding in Gracen has inflated the quantum of
originality needed to receive protection in derivative works
based on a protected underlying work, the holding in Enter-
tainment Research Group created an equally troubling con-
flict at the bottom end, or "floor," of the originality spectrum.
E. Troubles with Tiles at the Floor of Originality
The unpredictable and complex landscape of the law de-
veloping in assessing the quantum of originality necessary to
create a derivative work has generated some interesting con-
flicts.
Just as some courts may be overly severe in their treat-
ment of derivative works, others have taken a view so lib-
eral as to make even the 'merely trivial' standard mean-
ingless. This may be explained by an attempt to reward
skilled artisans, punish unethical defendants, or offer a
consolation prize for an underlying work that has argua-
bly tumbled into the public domain. 4
303. Entertainment Research Group, 122 F.3d at 1220 (citing Gracen, 698
F.2d at 305; Durham Indus., 630 F.2d at 911).
This conclusion finds support in our decisions in the somewhat analo-
gous context where we have decided not to grant copyright protection to
an artist's presentation of a song-even under an unfair competition
theory-where doing so would undermine the rights of the song's copy-
right holder by exposing her licensees to potential litigation.
Id. (citing Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 435 F.2d 711, 718 (9th Cir.
1970)).
304. Page, supra note 171, at 422-23.
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As demonstrated by the three-dimensional Santa Claus
in Doran, a work may receive copyright protection as a de-
rivative work even though the only derivation was to perform
a mechanical transformation, such as by forming a three-
dimensional Santa Claus. °5 Other cases have held that such
minuscule variations, imperceptible to the casual observer,
are insufficient."6 Cases such as Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Al-
buquerque A.R.T. Co.," 7 and Lee v. A.R.T. Co."' illustrate the
vastly different outcomes which occasionally arise when
courts attempt to quantify originality in derivative works.
Such varied results, caused by the application of differing
originality standards, present a clear need for courts to de-
velop a consistent requirement for the quantum of originality
necessary to receive copyright protection of derivative works.
1. The Mirage of Originality in Mirage Editions
In Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co.,"9 Al-
buquerque A.R.T. purchased the commemorative book, a
compilation of selected copyrighted individual art works and
personal commentaries, entitled NAGEL: The Art of Patrick
Nagel.310  Mirage Editions ("Mirage") exclusively published
and also owned the copyrights to many of Nagel's works."
Albuquerque A.R.T. employees purchased artwork prints
or books, glued each individual print onto a rectangular sheet
of black plastic material, exposed a narrow black margin
around the print, and fixed the black sheet onto the surface of
a rectangular white ceramic tile.32 Next, Albuquerque A.R.T.
employees applied a transparent plastic film over the print
and offered the tile with artwork mounted thereon for sale in
305. See, e.g., Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program Radio Corp., 740 F.2d
718, 722 (9th Cir. 1984); PAuL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND
PRACTICE § 5.3.1 (2d ed. 1996) (suggesting that a transformation is covered by
17 U.S.C. § 106(2) whenever it creates a "new work for a different market").
306. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d
Cir. 1951).
307. Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir.
1988).
308. Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 580 (7th Cir. 1997).
309. See Mirage Editions, 856 F.2d at 1341.
310. See id. at 1342 ("Patrick Nagel was an artist whose works appeared in
many media including lithographs, posters, serigraphs, and as graphic art in
many magazines, most notably Playboy.").
311. See id.
312. See id.
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the retail market.313
Pertinent to the resulting litigation, Albuquerque A.R.T.
performed this process with images from the Nagel book," 4
essentially resulting in a product transformed from an un-
derlying copyrighted work. In response, Mirage brought an
action alleging infringement of registered copyrights in the
artwork of Nagel and in the book.31
Granting Mirage's motion for summary judgment,316 the
court enjoined "appellants from removing individual art im-
ages from the book, mounting each individual image onto a
separate tile and advertising for sale and/or selling the tiles
with the images mounted thereon. 1 17 Reviewing the produc-
tion process of Albuquerque A.R.T.'s tile art, the district court
"concluded that the resulting products comprised derivative
work. ,
,318
Consistent with the district court's reasoning, Circuit
Judge Brunetti, speaking for the Ninth Circuit, extolled that
"[t]he protection of derivative rights extends beyond mere
protection against unauthorized copying to include the right
to make other versions of, perform, or exhibit the work."19
Judge Brunetti reasoned that what Albuquerque A.R.T. "has
clearly done here is to make another version of Nagel's art
works.., and that amounts to preparation of a derivative
work."32  The court advanced the legislative history sur-
313. See id.
314. See id.
315. See Mirage Editions, 856 F.2d at 1342. Mirage also alleged trademark
infringement and unfair competition. See id.
316. See id. at 1343 (basing the motion for summary judgment on both Lan-
ham Act and Copyright Act causes of action).
317. Id.
318. Id. (stating that the Copyright Act of 1976 grants the right to prepare
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work).
319. Id. (quoting Lone Ranger Television v. Program Radio Corp., 740 F.2d
718, 722 (9th Cir. 1984); Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1128 n.16 (9th Cir.
1979)). See Recent Case: Copyright Law-Derivative Works-Seventh Circuit
Holds That Mounting Copyrighted Notecards on Ceramic Tiles Does Not Consti-
tute Preparation of Derivative Works in Violation of the Copyright Act-Lee v.
A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997), 111 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1368-69
(1998) [hereinafter Recent Case] (analyzing the paradigms for copyright protec-
tion in an effort to understand Circuit Judge Brunetti's holding).
320. Mirage Editions, 856 F.2d at 1343 (citations omitted). The court rea-
soned that "Ibly borrowing and mounting the preexisting, copyrighted individ-
ual art images without the consent of the copyright proprietors-Mirage and
Dumas as to the art works and Van Der Marck as to the book-appellant has
prepared a derivative work and infringed the subject copyrights." Id.
20001 371
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rounding derivative works321 to sustain its conclusion that Al-
buquerque A.R.T. "has certainly recast or transformed the in-
dividual images by incorporating them into its tile-preparing
process."322
Ignoring the viability of the first sale doctrine 23 defense
to Mirage's infringement claims,324 the court concluded that
Albuquerque A.R.T.'s tile-preparing process created deriva-
tive works that infringed Mirage's exclusive rights.12 ' This
court did not apply the Durham Industries two-part test; in-
stead, Judge Brunetti employed a Doran-type analysis to find
a minimal amount of originality in the tile creation process.
Mirage Edition granted authors holding rights in underlying
works more protection than other courts. Unfortunately, the
trend continued.
The Ninth Circuit applied consistent reasoning in the
unpublished decision of Munoz v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co.
326
Reviewing a similar tiling process, the court again ruled that
the mere transformation of the underlying work satisfied all
prerequisites to obtain protection as a derivative work. 27
Following the holding in Mirage Editions, the court held that
incorporating Rie Munoz prints onto ceramic tiles constituted
321. See id. at 1343-44 ("The legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976
indicates that Congress intended that for a violation of the right to prepare de-
rivative works to occur 'the infringing work must incorporate a portion of the
copyrighted work in some form."').
322. Id. at 1344.
323. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of Sec-
tion 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under
this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of
that copy or phonorecord.").
324. See Mirage Editions, 856 F.2d at 1344. The court stated:
We recognize that, under the "first sale" doctrine as enunciated at 17
U.S.C. § 109(a)... , [Albuquerque A.R.T. Co.] can purchase a copy of
the Nagel book and subsequently alienate its ownership in that book.
However, the right to transfer applies only to the particular copy of the
book which appellant has purchased and nothing else. The mere sale
of the book to the appellant without a specific transfer by the copyright
holder of its exclusive right to prepare derivative works, does not
transfer that right to [Albuquerque A.R.T. Co.].
Id. at 1344.
325. See id. (stating that Dumas and Van Der Marck also have the right to
create derivative works).
326. Munoz v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 38 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpub-
lished table decision available at 1994 WL 574156, at *1).
327. See id.
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derivative works.
2. Less Leeway for Derivative Works in Lee
Though the Ninth Circuit continues to find derivative
works in what may be described as mere mechanical trans-
formations, 329 other courts, such as the Seventh Circuit in Lee
v. A.R.T. Co.,33° continue to apply a more traditional, logical
approach.
Annie Lee sold her works of art to Deck the Walls, a
commercial dealer of art.33' Deck the Walls sold some of Lee's
notecards and small lithographs to A.R.T. Company. 3 2 A.R.T.
employees bought the work legitimately, mounted it on a tile,
and resold what it had purchased.333  In contrast to Mirage
Editions, Circuit Judge Easterbrook, speaking for the Sev-
enth Circuit, reasoned that "[b]ecause the artist could capture
the value of her art's contribution to the finished product as
part of the price for the original transaction, the economic ra-
tionale for protecting an adaptation as 'derivative' is ab-
sent.
,3 4
328. See id.; see also Greenwich Workshop, Inc. v. Timber Creations, Inc., 932
F. Supp. 1210 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (following the binding precedent of Mirage Edi-
tions, the court held that the matting and framing artwork removed from copy-
righted book constituted derivative work infringing copyright in book and art-
work).
329. See Recent Case, supra note 319, at 1368 (criticizing the Ninth Circuit's
definition of derivative works).
330. Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997).
331. See id.
332. See id. at 580.
333. See id. at 581. District Court Judge Norgle stated that "the Munoz case
involved strikingly similar facts." Lee v. Deck The Walls, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 576,
578 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
334. Lee, 125 F.3d at 581 (citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUDIES 325, 353-57 (1989)).
The court reasoned:
An alteration that includes (or consumes) a complete copy of the origi-
nal lacks economic significance. One work changes hands multiple
times, exactly what § 109(a) permits, so it may lack legal significance
too. But § 106(2) creates a separate exclusive right, to "prepare deriva-
tive works," and Lee believes that affixing the art to the tile is "prepa-
ration," so that A.R.T. would have violated § 106(2) even if it had
dumped the finished tiles into the Marianas Trench.
Id. See Recent Case, supra note 319, at 1365 (criticizing the breadth of the Sev-
enth Circuit's approach).
The Seventh Circuit reached the proper result in rejecting the plain-
tiffs unjustifiably broad interpretation of 106(2) of the Copyright Act.
However, the court's introductory dicta-that derivative works protec-
tion should depend exclusively on economic considerations-repre-
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District Court Judge Norgle concluded that A.R.T.'s
mounting of Lee's works on tile did not constitute an "original
work of authorship" because it did not differ in form or func-
tion from displaying a painting in a frame or placing a me-
dallion in a velvet case.335 In contrast to Munoz and Mirage
Editions, Lee refused to recognize that the bonding of the art
by epoxy resins to a tile created a derivative work.33 Essen-
tially, Lee concurred with the cases discussed above, in which
works created from copyrighted underlying works did not re-
ceive derivative work status where the creator proved only a
transformation in form from the original work.
Judge Easterbrook agreed with the district court, hold-
ing that the tiles did not amount to art reproductions.337
A.R.T. simply purchased and mounted Lee's original works
without changing them or creating an original addition
within the newly created piece.338 Judge Easterbrook, mindful
of the absurd implications from the holding in Mirage Edi-
tions, playfully mused over whether a purchaser would create
a derivative work by jotting a note on one of the note cards,
using it as a coaster for a drink, applying his collector seal, or
cutting it in half.9 Based on these spiraling connotations,
Judge Easterbrook retorted that "[a] definition of derivative
work that makes criminals out of art collectors and tourists is
jarring despite Lee's gracious offer not to commence civil liti-
gation.
340
sented an unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of the right to prepare
derivative works and ignored the extent to which noneconomic inter-
ests should, and do, inform the scope of federal copyright protection.
Id. (emphasis added).
335. See Lee, 125 F.3d at 581 ("No one believes that a museum violates §
106(2) every time it changes the frame of a painting that is still under copy-
right, although the choice of frame or glazing affects the impression the art con-
veys, and many artists specify frames (or pedestals for sculptures) in detail.").
336. See id. (recognizing, in contravention of Mirage Editions, that the nor-
mal means of mounting and displaying art are easily reversible).
337. See id. at 582 (discussing how A.R.T.'s actions do not fit the definition of
recast, transformed, or adapted).
338. See id. (stating that the tiles still depicted the same image that they
contained when they left Lee's studio in disapproval of Mirage Editions) (citing
2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 823-24 (1994)).
339. See id.
340. Id. (refuting Lee's explanation that "as a practical matter artists would
not file suit").
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3. Precious Guidance from Precious Moments
Like stalwart warriors locked in fierce opposition, the
Seventh Circuit and the Ninth Circuit existed deadlocked at
the shallow end of the originality pool, one applying hybrid
standards affected by the public domain status of the under-
lying work, the other remaining true to the more traditional
approaches. However, in the clash between the two, it some-
times takes an ally to best the foe. In swaying the tally in fa-
vor of retaining the traditional approaches to originality
standards, Precious Moments, Inc. v. La Infantil, Inc.34 ' de-
parted from the reasoning of Mirage Editions.34
Precious Moments" 3 sued La Infantil44 for using authen-
tic, lawfully acquired Precious Moments fabric to manufac-
ture and sell baby bedding.34 When considering whether La
Infantil created a derivative work, District Court Judge
Perez-Gimenez criticized the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit
when dealing with the originality requirement for derivative
works." ' He explained that "[t]he Ninth Circuit requires one
seeking a copyright in a derivative work to meet all the re-
quirements of copyrightability but does not require a work to
be independently copyrightable in order for it to be considered
a derivative work infringing on the underlying work."47
341. Precious Moments, Inc. v. La Infantil, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 66 (D.P.R.
1997).
342. See Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th
Cir. 1988).
343. Precious Moments is a company engaged in the business of licensing the
"Precious Moments" trademark and artwork to licensees who manufacture and
distribute numerous products, including greeting cards, figurines, stationery,
jewelry, dolls, fabrics, baby bedding, and baby accessories. See Precious Mo-
ments, 971 F. Supp. at 66-67.
344. La Infantil is "[a] retail store that sells baby products, including furni-
ture, bedding, clothes, and accessories. Some of the bedding it sells is manufac-
tured by Teresita Martin Sewing Service from authentic, lawfully-acquired Pre-
cious Moments fabrics." Id. at 67. Precious Moments, Inc. sued La Infantil, Inc.
for "copyright and trademark infringement, unfair competition, and dilution
under federal and Puerto Rico law." Id.
345. See id. at 66. Precious Moments additionally alleged that La Infantil
was "selling counterfeit Precious Moments products, [but] the evidence pre-
sented with the motion for a preliminary injunction did not support that allega-
tion and the issue dropped out of the case at the preliminary injunction hear-
ing." Id. at 67 n.1.
346. See id. at 68.
347. Id. (citing Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d
965, 967-69 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that fixation in a tangible medium of ex-
pression is unnecessary for derivative work to infringe)).
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Judge Perez-Gimenez approved of the reasoning in Lee
that denounced the Ninth Circuit's double standard.348 In Lee,
the court found that Mirage Editions's "(1) 'risks that courts
will naively apply this broad definition to find activities in-
fringing that are more properly viewed as altogether beyond
the scope of copyright,' and (2) ignores the definition of a 'de-
rivative work' found in § 101, in which Congress specifically
included an originality requirement." '349 In unison with Judge
Perez-Gimenez's criticisms of the dangerous holding in Mi-
rage Editions, commentators also express their concern at the
"unwarranted extension of the Copyright Act. '" °
The court in Precious Moments, in direct contravention of
the Ninth Circuit's holding in Mirage Editions, found that the
necessary element of originality was absent from the items
manufactured for La Infantil from the Precious Moments fab-
ric.351 Because the works in question did not evidence the
requisite originality, they "do not constitute 'derivative works'
infringing on Precious Moments's copyright."
352
In conclusion, while the courts in Lee and Precious Mo-
ments desperately try to stem an unimaginable flood of de-
rivative works, the Ninth Circuit has opened the copyright
regime to incomprehensible abuse. At minimum, Mirage Edi-
348. See id. at 69.
349. Precious Moments, 971 F. Supp. at 68 (citing Lee v. Deck The Walls,
Inc., 925 F. Supp. 576, 580 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (quoting Edward G. Black & Michael
H. Page, Add-On Infringements: When Computer Add-Ons and Peripherals
Should (and Should Not) be Considered Infringing Derivative Works Under
Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc. and Other Recent Deci-
sions, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 615, 628-29 (1993))).
Reading Galoob in conjunction with Mirage Editions, however, it ap-
pears that the Ninth Circuit also relaxes the originality requirement
when considering whether a work is a derivative work for purposes of
infringement. Even if Galoob was correct with regard to fixation, Mi-
rage Editions reads the originality requirement out of the definition of
"derivative work."
Id. at 67 n.4.
350. Id. at 68-69; see NIMMER, supra note 64, § 3.03 (quoted in Lee, 925 F.
Supp. at 579 n.2); 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 5.3, at 5:81 (2d ed. 1996)
(described as "condemning Mirage as an unwarranted extension of the Copy-
right Act" in Mark Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Prop-
erty Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1084 n.144 (1997)); Black & Page, supra note
349, at 629 (describing Mirage Editions as "often criticized"); David Goldberg
and Robert Bernstein, "What is a Derivative Work?... Continued," N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 20, 1996, at 3 ("[T]he Ninth Circuit approach applied in Greenwich Work-
shop is unsupported by the statutory text.").
351. See Precious Moments, 971 F. Supp. at 69.
352. Id.
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tions has cast uncertainty into determining the quantum of
originality necessary to create a derivative work, even if few
presently follow its rationale.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing case law evidences, the perpetual vacil-
lation in the "more than merely trivial" standard53 has
prompted an urgent need for judges to adopt a consistent test
to adjudicate the quantum of originality necessary to receive
copyright protection in a derivative work. Courts can forge
the various standards enunciated in the survey of cases pre-
sented in this article to structure a unified standard that
greatly simplifies the copyright law analysis of originality.
In short, copyright law must continue to grow and
change, but do so responsibly. Judges must remember to ex-
ercise caution when venturing too far from the "more than
merely trivial" "distinguishable variation" standard. Re-
quiring too much originality or recognizing too little of a
variation unjustifiably burdens an already unwieldy area of
the law. Without employing the heightened Gracen standard
and by rejecting the lowered Mirage Editions standard,
judges should follow the two-part test of Durham Industries
with confidence that the derivative works created will enrich
our society without burdening the rights enjoyed in the un-
derlying works.
The legislature expected the courts to define this origi-
nality requirement. Though occasionally deviating "trivially"
from the path, the majority of the decisions form a cohesive,
consistent understanding that a derivative work should dem-
onstrate "more than merely trivial" "distinguishable varia-
tions" from the underlying work that are attributable to the
author. Finally, because copyright protection does not extend
to the unoriginal elements of a derivative work, discrimina-
tion against derivative works that are based on protected,
underlying works is inappropriate.
Decisions such as Mirage Editions and Gracen should not
be inferred to alter the quantum necessary to attain protec-
353. Compare Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d
1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding a derivative work based on a tiling method),
with Gracen, v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983) (refusing to
find a derivative work to sustain a suspicion that permission was not properly
given by the author of the underlying work).
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tion. Circuit Judge Frank's expectation of "more than merely
trivial" "distinguishable variations" in Alfred Bell & Co.35 re-
mains a tenable and useful standard to judge whether a de-
rivative work, irrespective of the public domain or copyright
protected status of the underlying work, can demonstrate suf-
ficient originality to enjoy copyright protection.
354. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir.
1951).
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